Assessing the Accuracy of Decisions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20400459 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Deborah Frisch (University of Oregon, Eugene), Steven K Jones (University of Oregon, Eugene) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 115-135 |
| Publication date | 1993-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theory & Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0959354393031005 |
| OpenAlex | W2047898609 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 38 |
Much research demonstrates that people's choices do not conform to utility theory, a model of rational decision-making (Baron, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1988). Researchers have begun to question the normative status of utility theory in light of the many empirical violations of the theory. We argue that consistency with a formal model is not an appropriate standard for evaluating the quality of decisions. Rather, we propose that accuracy is a more useful standard. We define an accurate decision as one in which there is a one-to-one correspondence between the factors that affect a decision and those that affect experience. Based on our definition, we address the question of whether violations of normative models such as expected value theory and expected utility theory reflect inaccurate decisions. We argue that some violations of normative models do lead to inaccurate decisions. However, many violations may arise because the normative models prohibit factors from affecting decisions that do in fact affect the experience of the outcomes of decisions
Business decision mapping · Causal decision theory · Decision analysis · Decision theory · Economics · Empirical research · Epistemology · Evidential reasoning approach · Expected utility hypothesis · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Normative · Normative model of decision-making · Prospect theory · Subjective expected utility · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence
Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded
Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Response-induced reversals of preference in gambling
Psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance
The psychology of sunk cost
Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice
Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics
Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque
Contingent weighting in judgment and choice.
Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice
Ambiguity and uncertainty in probabilistic inference.
Between Hope and Fear
Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions.
"Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom
Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
Prospect Theory
Toward a positive theory of consumer choice
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Choices, values, and frames
Predicting a changing taste
Ambiguity and rationality
Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being
Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making
The Utility of Wealth
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
Regret Theory
Errors and mistakes
Beyond discrete biases
Choice Under Uncertainty
How Consumers are Affected by the Framing of Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the Product
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2011 (18) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |