Elizabeth G Jackson
Biographic Data
| ID | 176138 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elizabeth G Jackson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elizabeth G |
| FAMILY NAME | Jackson |
| SIGNATURE | JACKSON E G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Toronto Metropolitan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6234-4488 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 33 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Navigating Metrics
This study e x amines variations in project evaluation practices among 10 major international development organisations and their alignment with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Based on a mixed‐methods analysis of 4112 project evaluation reports (2015–2017 and 2020–2022) across six regions and 11 sectors, it reveals persistent methodological disparities, arising from differences in Likert scales, rubrics and the adoption …
Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle
Moral philosophers generally affirm that there are moral options: a single person sometimes has multiple morally permissible actions at a time. But epistemologists generally deny that there are epistemic options: a single person never has multiple epistemically permissible doxastic attitudes at a time. This asymmetry is striking. Furthermore, there are intuitive cases of epistemic options. However, it's not clear how these cases differ from cases…
An Epistemic Version of Pascal's Wager
Epistemic consequentialism is the view that epistemic goodness is more fundamental than epistemic rightness. In this article, I examine the relationship between epistemic consequentialism and theistic belief. I argue that in an epistemic consequentialist framework, there is an epistemic reason to believe in God. Imagine having an unlimited amount of time to ask an omniscient being anything you wanted. The potential epistemic benefits would be eno…
Anti-Theists cannot have Theistic Faith
A topic of recent interest involves the nature of theistic faith, and in particular, the boundaries of such faith. For example, philosophers have taken opposing positions on whether atheists and agnostics can have theistic faith. I consider a related question: whether anti-theists, who think God’s existence would be a bad thing, can have faith. I argue for a negative answer, although with several caveats
Faith is weakly positive
A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs
A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is that of how belief and credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, what it is to have a credence just is to have a particular kind of belief—that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, I argue against the belief-first view: specificall…
Probing the mind of God
Although much has been written about divine knowledge, and some on divine beliefs, virtually nothing has been written about divine credences. In this article we comparatively assess four views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views…
Belief, Faith, and Hope
I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes play the same role in rationalizing action. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, …
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism
We call attention to certain cases of epistemic akrasia, arguing that they support belief‐credence dualism. Belief‐credence dualism is the view that belief and credence are irreducible, equally fundamental attitudes. Consider the case of an agent who believes p, has low credence in p, and thus believes that they shouldn’t believe p. We argue that dualists, as opposed to belief‐firsters (who say credence reduces to belief) and credence‐firsters (w…
Animating Discipline Disparities through Debilitating Practices
Context Girls of Color are overrepresented in school disciplinary actions based on subjectively judged, minor infractions. Studies have consistently shown that this exclusionary discipline has long-lasting impact on Girls of Color and their educational outcomes, including increased risk for pushout and involvement in the criminal legal system. Focus of Study We sought to uncover the processes that animate the statistics of overrepre-sentation of …
Credence
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclud…
Belief, credence, and evidence
The relationship between belief and credence
Sometimes epistemologists theorize aboutbelief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize aboutcredence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descri…
Teaching & learning guide for
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and ou…
Belief, credence, and faith
In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically ration…
Celebration and disillusionment in contemporary India
This article examines representations of Muslim weddings and their aftermaths in two contemporary anglophone novels by Indian Muslim women: Shama Futehally’s Tara Lane (1993) and Samina Ali’s Madras on Rainy Days (2004). These two first-person narratives contrast strikingly with each other, thus illustrating the wide diversity of cultural practices even within the same (privileged) class of Indian Muslims. Tara Lane is set in Bombay and Madras on…
Gender and communal politics in Shama Futehally’s Reaching Bombay Central
Most of the best-known women writers of anglophone Indian fiction have been Hindu, and in the context of the intensification of communal politics in India, it is important to also consider the voices of their Muslim counterparts. Shama Futehally’s novel Reaching Bombay Central ( 2002 ) engages with both gender and communal politics from a Muslim perspective, and this article examines the ways in which the narrative implicitly challenges a number …
Survey of Characteristics and Treatment Preferences for Physicians Treating Postpartum Depression in the General Medical Setting
Racial Differences in the Use of Antidepressants and Counseling for Depression Among Homeless Women
Mythic Origins
The story of Diogo Alvares or “Caramuru,” one of Brazil’s first white inhabitants, is a recurring theme in Brazilian historiography, literature, and imagination. Probably from the town of Viana do Castelo in Minho, Portugal,1 it is suspected that Diogo Alvares arrived in a wrecked ship at the beginning of Portuguese colonization.2 He resided in Bahia for many years (between three and six decades), in sporadic contact with the Portuguese. During t…
The relationship between belief and credence
Sometimes epistemologists theorize aboutbelief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize aboutcredence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descri…
Belief, credence, and evidence
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and ou…
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
Gender and communal politics in Shama Futehally’s Reaching Bombay Central
Most of the best-known women writers of anglophone Indian fiction have been Hindu, and in the context of the intensification of communal politics in India, it is important to also consider the voices of their Muslim counterparts. Shama Futehally’s novel Reaching Bombay Central ( 2002 ) engages with both gender and communal politics from a Muslim perspective, and this article examines the ways in which the narrative implicitly challenges a number …
Mythic Origins
The story of Diogo Alvares or “Caramuru,” one of Brazil’s first white inhabitants, is a recurring theme in Brazilian historiography, literature, and imagination. Probably from the town of Viana do Castelo in Minho, Portugal,1 it is suspected that Diogo Alvares arrived in a wrecked ship at the beginning of Portuguese colonization.2 He resided in Bahia for many years (between three and six decades), in sporadic contact with the Portuguese. During t…
Faith is weakly positive
Racial Differences in the Use of Antidepressants and Counseling for Depression Among Homeless Women
Mythic Origins
The story of Diogo Alvares or “Caramuru,” one of Brazil’s first white inhabitants, is a recurring theme in Brazilian historiography, literature, and imagination. Probably from the town of Viana do Castelo in Minho, Portugal,1 it is suspected that Diogo Alvares arrived in a wrecked ship at the beginning of Portuguese colonization.2 He resided in Bahia for many years (between three and six decades), in sporadic contact with the Portuguese. During t…
Racial Differences in the Use of Antidepressants and Counseling for Depression Among Homeless Women
Survey of Characteristics and Treatment Preferences for Physicians Treating Postpartum Depression in the General Medical Setting
Gender and communal politics in Shama Futehally’s Reaching Bombay Central
Most of the best-known women writers of anglophone Indian fiction have been Hindu, and in the context of the intensification of communal politics in India, it is important to also consider the voices of their Muslim counterparts. Shama Futehally’s novel Reaching Bombay Central ( 2002 ) engages with both gender and communal politics from a Muslim perspective, and this article examines the ways in which the narrative implicitly challenges a number …
Celebration and disillusionment in contemporary India
This article examines representations of Muslim weddings and their aftermaths in two contemporary anglophone novels by Indian Muslim women: Shama Futehally’s Tara Lane (1993) and Samina Ali’s Madras on Rainy Days (2004). These two first-person narratives contrast strikingly with each other, thus illustrating the wide diversity of cultural practices even within the same (privileged) class of Indian Muslims. Tara Lane is set in Bombay and Madras on…
Belief, credence, and faith
In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically ration…
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and ou…
Animating Discipline Disparities through Debilitating Practices
Context Girls of Color are overrepresented in school disciplinary actions based on subjectively judged, minor infractions. Studies have consistently shown that this exclusionary discipline has long-lasting impact on Girls of Color and their educational outcomes, including increased risk for pushout and involvement in the criminal legal system. Focus of Study We sought to uncover the processes that animate the statistics of overrepre-sentation of …
Credence
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclud…
Belief, credence, and evidence
The relationship between belief and credence
Sometimes epistemologists theorize aboutbelief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize aboutcredence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descri…
Teaching & learning guide for
Belief, Faith, and Hope
I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes play the same role in rationalizing action. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, …
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism
We call attention to certain cases of epistemic akrasia, arguing that they support belief‐credence dualism. Belief‐credence dualism is the view that belief and credence are irreducible, equally fundamental attitudes. Consider the case of an agent who believes p, has low credence in p, and thus believes that they shouldn’t believe p. We argue that dualists, as opposed to belief‐firsters (who say credence reduces to belief) and credence‐firsters (w…
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs
A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is that of how belief and credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, what it is to have a credence just is to have a particular kind of belief—that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, I argue against the belief-first view: specificall…
Probing the mind of God
Although much has been written about divine knowledge, and some on divine beliefs, virtually nothing has been written about divine credences. In this article we comparatively assess four views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views…
A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager
An Epistemic Version of Pascal's Wager
Epistemic consequentialism is the view that epistemic goodness is more fundamental than epistemic rightness. In this article, I examine the relationship between epistemic consequentialism and theistic belief. I argue that in an epistemic consequentialist framework, there is an epistemic reason to believe in God. Imagine having an unlimited amount of time to ask an omniscient being anything you wanted. The potential epistemic benefits would be eno…
Anti-Theists cannot have Theistic Faith
A topic of recent interest involves the nature of theistic faith, and in particular, the boundaries of such faith. For example, philosophers have taken opposing positions on whether atheists and agnostics can have theistic faith. I consider a related question: whether anti-theists, who think God’s existence would be a bad thing, can have faith. I argue for a negative answer, although with several caveats
Faith is weakly positive
Navigating Metrics
This study e x amines variations in project evaluation practices among 10 major international development organisations and their alignment with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Based on a mixed‐methods analysis of 4112 project evaluation reports (2015–2017 and 2020–2022) across six regions and 11 sectors, it reveals persistent methodological disparities, arising from differences in Likert scales, rubrics and the adoption …
Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle
Moral philosophers generally affirm that there are moral options: a single person sometimes has multiple morally permissible actions at a time. But epistemologists generally deny that there are epistemic options: a single person never has multiple epistemically permissible doxastic attitudes at a time. This asymmetry is striking. Furthermore, there are intuitive cases of epistemic options. However, it's not clear how these cases differ from cases…
Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (14 works) · Credence (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (7 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works)