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Belief, credence, and moral encroachment

Bibliographic Data

ID10811667
AuthorsJames Fritz (0000-0003-2184-1215, Virginia Commonwealth University), Elizabeth G Jackson (0000-0002-6234-4488, Toronto Metropolitan University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume199
Issue1-2
Pages1387-1408
Publication date2021-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-020-02799-6
OpenAlexW3046174916
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited50

Credence · Epistemology · Experimental philosophy · Metaphysics · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Philosophical methodology · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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    Open Access•Rima Basu•Philosophy Compass•2023

  • Political Beliefs

    Open Access•Oliver Traldi•Political Beliefs•2024

  • The Epistemic Insignificance of Moral Encroachment

    Open Access•Vishnu Sridharan•Ratio•2026

  • Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency

    Cory Davia•Philosophical Explorations•2023

  • MeToo & the role of Outright Belief

    Open Access•Alexandra Lloyd•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2022

  • Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence

    Open Access•Caroline von Klemperer•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • Belief, blame, and inquiry

    Open Access•Z Quanbeck•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • The Constitutive Inheritance Account of the Ethical Significance of Belief

    Z Quanbeck•Ethics•2025

  • The Ethics of Disbelief

    Eleanor Gordon-Smith•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2025

  • Uncoordinated Norms of Belief

    Oliver Traldi•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2023

  • Relevance and risk

    Open Access•Greg Gardiner•Synthese•2021

  • Looking Beneath the Behaviour

    Open Access•Hugo Cossette‐Lefebvre•Philosophy & Technology•2026

  • Statistical resentment, or

    Open Access•Dan Enoch, Levi Spectre•Synthese•2021

  • Moral encroachment and group-to-individual inferences

    Open Access•Martin Smith•Philosophical Studies•2025

  • Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays

    P F Strawson•Freedom And Resentment And Other…•2008

  • Knowledge and Practical Interests

    Jason Stanley•KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL INTERESTS.•2005

  • Probabilistic Knowledge

    Sarah Mo, Sarah Moss•Probabilistic Knowledge•2018

  • Knowledge and its Limits

    T Williamson•Knowledge and Its Limits•2002

  • Betting on Theories

    Open Access•Patrick Maher•Betting on Theories•1993

  • Knowledge in an Uncertain World

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•Knowledge in an uncertain world•2009

  • Belief, credence, and norms

    Open Access•Lara Buchak•Philosophical Studies•2014

  • Friendship and Belief

    Simon Keller•Philosophical Papers•2004

  • The wrongs of racist beliefs

    Open Access•Rima Basu•Philosophical Studies•2019

  • Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge

    Open Access•Mark Schroeder•Philosophical Studies•2012

  • IX—Moral Encroachment

    Open Access•Sarah Mo, Sarah Moss•Proceedings of the Aristotelian…•2018

  • We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties

    Michael T Nelson•Mind•2010

  • What we epistemically owe to each other

    Open Access•Rima Basu•Philosophical Studies•2019

  • When Beliefs Wrong

    Mark Schroeder•Philosophical Topics•2018

  • Knowledge and Action

    John Hawthorne, Jason Stanley et al.•The Journal of Philosophy•2008

  • Epistemic Partiality in Friendship

    Sarah Stroud•Ethics•2006

  • On the epistemic costs of implicit bias

    Open Access•Tamar Szabó Gendler•Philosophical Studies•2011

  • Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism

    Open Access•Jennifer Nagel•Philosophical Perspectives•2010

  • Varieties of Moral Encroachment

    Open Access•Renée Jorgensen Bolinger•Philosophical Perspectives•2020

  • The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification

    William P Alston•Philosophical Perspectives•1988

  • The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations

    Open Access•Renée Jorgensen Bolinger•Synthese•2020

  • Agency of belief and intention

    Open Access•A K Flowerree•Synthese•2017

  • Relevance and risk

    Open Access•Greg Gardiner•Synthese•2021

  • A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism

    Open Access•James M Joyce•Philosophy of Science•1998

  • Can Pragmatists Be Moderate

    Open Access•Alex Worsnip•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2020

  • Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1

    Open Access•Jacob Ross, Mark Schroeder•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012

  • Arguments for–or against–Probabilism

    Alan Hajek•The British Journal for the…•2008

  • Actions, Reasons, and Causes

    Donald Davidson•The Journal of Philosophy•1963

  • The relationship between belief and credence

    Open Access•Elizabeth G Jackson•Philosophy Compass•2020

  • Nietzsche's aesthetics

    Open Access•Andrew Huddleston•Philosophy Compass•2020

  • How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment

    Elizabeth G Jackson•The Philosophical Quarterly•2019

  • Bayesianism I

    Open Access•Kenny Easwaran•Philosophy Compass•2011

Unique citing works14
Citations per year2.8
Citation span2021 - 2026 (6)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 13

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