James Fritz
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995752 |
|---|---|
| NAME | James Fritz |
| GIVEN NAMES | James |
| FAMILY NAME | Fritz |
| SIGNATURE | FRITZ J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Virginia Commonwealth University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2184-1215 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
External‐World Skepticism and the New Ethics of Belief
External‐world skepticism challenges, among other things, the epistemic credentials of beliefs about other people. Some external‐world skeptics deny that I know my loved ones exist; some claim that my belief that my loved ones exist is epistemically impermissible. However, abandoning this belief would be highly unattractive. In fact, new developments in the ethics of belief provide the groundwork for an argument that skeptical doubts about loved …
A Permissive View of Fitting Emotional Change
Many object-directed emotions change in intensity over time. Importantly, this sometimes happens even though the emotion’s object remains unchanged: grief over the tragic loss of a loved one, for instance, fades even though the loss remains tragic. Can a changing emotion continue to fit its unchanging object? Existing answers to this question tend to vindicate strikingly narrow visions of fitting emotional change: some, for instance, consider it …
Deference to opaque systems and morally exemplary decisions
Many have recently argued that there are weighty reasons against making high-stakes decisions solely on the basis of recommendations from artificially intelligent (AI) systems. Even if deference to a given AI system were known to reliably result in the right action being taken, the argument goes, that deference would lack morally important characteristics: the resulting decisions would not, for instance, be based on an appreciation of right-makin…
Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like
Ethics and epistemic hopelessness
This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic …
Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action
Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism
This essay provides a novel argument for impurism , the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious pr…
Online Shaming and the Ethics of Public Disapproval
This article illuminates an underappreciated tension between two desiderata for moral disapproval. First, moral disapproval should aspire to openness . This means, among other things, that it should aspire not to require silence from wronged parties. Second, moral disapproval should aspire to decency . This means, among other things, that it should not predictably cause psychological harm in a way that alienates or isolates people from their mora…
Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment
In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensiona…
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety
Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism
This essay provides a novel argument for impurism , the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious pr…
Online Shaming and the Ethics of Public Disapproval
This article illuminates an underappreciated tension between two desiderata for moral disapproval. First, moral disapproval should aspire to openness . This means, among other things, that it should aspire not to require silence from wronged parties. Second, moral disapproval should aspire to decency . This means, among other things, that it should not predictably cause psychological harm in a way that alienates or isolates people from their mora…
Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment
In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensiona…
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety
Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action
Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like
Ethics and epistemic hopelessness
This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic …
Deference to opaque systems and morally exemplary decisions
Many have recently argued that there are weighty reasons against making high-stakes decisions solely on the basis of recommendations from artificially intelligent (AI) systems. Even if deference to a given AI system were known to reliably result in the right action being taken, the argument goes, that deference would lack morally important characteristics: the resulting decisions would not, for instance, be based on an appreciation of right-makin…
External‐World Skepticism and the New Ethics of Belief
External‐world skepticism challenges, among other things, the epistemic credentials of beliefs about other people. Some external‐world skeptics deny that I know my loved ones exist; some claim that my belief that my loved ones exist is epistemically impermissible. However, abandoning this belief would be highly unattractive. In fact, new developments in the ethics of belief provide the groundwork for an argument that skeptical doubts about loved …
A Permissive View of Fitting Emotional Change
Many object-directed emotions change in intensity over time. Importantly, this sometimes happens even though the emotion’s object remains unchanged: grief over the tragic loss of a loved one, for instance, fades even though the loss remains tragic. Can a changing emotion continue to fit its unchanging object? Existing answers to this question tend to vindicate strikingly narrow visions of fitting emotional change: some, for instance, consider it …
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Face (sociological concept) (3 works)