Uncoordinated Norms of Belief
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293681 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Oliver Traldi (0000-0002-5116-7850, University of Notre Dame, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 625-637 |
| Publication date | 2023-07-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2022.2030378 |
| OpenAlex | W4220874269 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 24 |
If it is ethically wrong to hold some beliefs, there may be a conflict between the demands of morality and the demands of rationality. A recent theory holds that no such conflict exists: any morally wrong belief is also irrational to hold, made irrational through a phenomenon of radical moral encroachment. In this paper, I argue that radical moral encroachment fails to coordinate ethical and epistemic norms, given plausible epistemological principles and various substantive accounts of which beliefs are morally wrong, including those endorsed by radical moral encroachment theorists themselves
Epistemology · Irrational number · Morality · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Correcting The Guide to Objective Chance
The wrongs of racist beliefs
IX—Moral Encroachment
Evidentialism
What we epistemically owe to each other
When Beliefs Wrong
Radical moral encroachment
Knowledge and Action
Symposium: Chance and Credence
On the epistemic costs of implicit bias
"What Is "Naturalized Epistemology
The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
How to argue for pragmatic encroachment
Dilemmic Epistemology
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions
| Citations per year | 1.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |