Morality of Belief II
Three Challenges and An Extension
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079971 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rima Basu (0000-0001-8083-5996, Claremont McKenna College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Publication date | 2023-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12935 |
| OpenAlex | W4380486643 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 35 |
In this paper I explore three challenges to the morality of belief. First, whether we have the necessary control over our beliefs to be held responsible for them, i.e., the challenge of doxastic involuntarism. Second, the question of whether belief is really the attitude that we care about in the cases used to motivate the morality of belief. Third, whether attitudes weaker than belief, such as credence, can wrong, I then end by turning to how answers to the previous challenges suggest a way of extending the morality of belief to encompass a way of thinking of the moral mind more generally
Credence · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Extension (predicate logic · Morality · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Probabilistic Knowledge
Belief, credence, and norms
The wrongs of racist beliefs
IX—Moral Encroachment
What we epistemically owe to each other
Responsibility for Attitudes
Radical moral encroachment
What Use Are Real-World Cases for Philosophers
Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief
People recognize and condone their own morally motivated reasoning
On the epistemic costs of implicit bias
Varieties of Moral Encroachment
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
Don’t forget forgetting
Involuntary Sins
| Citations per year | 3.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |