Rima Basu
Biographic Data
| ID | 3602089 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rima Basu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rima |
| FAMILY NAME | Basu |
| SIGNATURE | BASU R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Claremont McKenna College |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8083-5996 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Bullshit philosophy
Academic journals and peer review serve dual roles in the academic ecosystem: advancing knowledge and advancing careers. This duality can lead researchers to employ strategic opportunism to game the system through a variety of means ranging from fraud to plagiarism. This paper highlights another strategy that can seem instrumentally rational in the face of these pressures: bullshitting. With respect to philosophical research, such an approach is …
Risky Inquiry
Philosophical inquiry strives to be the unencumbered exploration of ideas. That is, unlike scientific research, which is subject to ethical oversight, it is commonly thought that it would either be inappropriate, or that it would undermine what philosophy fundamentally is, if philosophical research were subject to similar ethical oversight. Against this, I argue that philosophy is in need of a reckoning. Philosophical inquiry is a morally hazardo…
Morality of Belief II
In this paper I explore three challenges to the morality of belief. First, whether we have the necessary control over our beliefs to be held responsible for them, i.e., the challenge of doxastic involuntarism. Second, the question of whether belief is really the attitude that we care about in the cases used to motivate the morality of belief. Third, whether attitudes weaker than belief, such as credence, can wrong, I then end by turning to how an…
The Morality of Belief I
It is no surprise that we should be careful when it comes to what we believe. Believing false things can be costly. The morality of belief, also known as doxastic wronging, takes things a step further by suggesting that certain beliefs can not only be costly, they can also wrong. This article surveys some accounts of how this could be so. That is, how beliefs wrong
The wrongs of racist beliefs
What we epistemically owe to each other
Radical moral encroachment
Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified ca…
Morality of Belief II
In this paper I explore three challenges to the morality of belief. First, whether we have the necessary control over our beliefs to be held responsible for them, i.e., the challenge of doxastic involuntarism. Second, the question of whether belief is really the attitude that we care about in the cases used to motivate the morality of belief. Third, whether attitudes weaker than belief, such as credence, can wrong, I then end by turning to how an…
Risky Inquiry
Philosophical inquiry strives to be the unencumbered exploration of ideas. That is, unlike scientific research, which is subject to ethical oversight, it is commonly thought that it would either be inappropriate, or that it would undermine what philosophy fundamentally is, if philosophical research were subject to similar ethical oversight. Against this, I argue that philosophy is in need of a reckoning. Philosophical inquiry is a morally hazardo…
The Morality of Belief I
It is no surprise that we should be careful when it comes to what we believe. Believing false things can be costly. The morality of belief, also known as doxastic wronging, takes things a step further by suggesting that certain beliefs can not only be costly, they can also wrong. This article surveys some accounts of how this could be so. That is, how beliefs wrong
The wrongs of racist beliefs
What we epistemically owe to each other
Radical moral encroachment
Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified ca…
Risky Inquiry
Philosophical inquiry strives to be the unencumbered exploration of ideas. That is, unlike scientific research, which is subject to ethical oversight, it is commonly thought that it would either be inappropriate, or that it would undermine what philosophy fundamentally is, if philosophical research were subject to similar ethical oversight. Against this, I argue that philosophy is in need of a reckoning. Philosophical inquiry is a morally hazardo…
Morality of Belief II
In this paper I explore three challenges to the morality of belief. First, whether we have the necessary control over our beliefs to be held responsible for them, i.e., the challenge of doxastic involuntarism. Second, the question of whether belief is really the attitude that we care about in the cases used to motivate the morality of belief. Third, whether attitudes weaker than belief, such as credence, can wrong, I then end by turning to how an…
The Morality of Belief I
It is no surprise that we should be careful when it comes to what we believe. Believing false things can be costly. The morality of belief, also known as doxastic wronging, takes things a step further by suggesting that certain beliefs can not only be costly, they can also wrong. This article surveys some accounts of how this could be so. That is, how beliefs wrong
Bullshit philosophy
Academic journals and peer review serve dual roles in the academic ecosystem: advancing knowledge and advancing careers. This duality can lead researchers to employ strategic opportunism to game the system through a variety of means ranging from fraud to plagiarism. This paper highlights another strategy that can seem instrumentally rational in the face of these pressures: bullshitting. With respect to philosophical research, such an approach is …
Epistemology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (6 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Morality (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works)