Gregory B Pollock
Biographic Data
| ID | 180857 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gregory B Pollock |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gregory B |
| FAMILY NAME | Pollock |
| SIGNATURE | POLLOCK G B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University and Arizona State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Kin Selective Suicide
Social Roles as an Effective Learning Mechanism
Using the `Buyer-Seller' game as an idealized form of social interaction across complementary roles, we examine two forms of `myopic learning', where individuals try to improve their response to their immediately past (social) environment. In role sampling, individuals examine a (random) sample of role equivalents, `updating' strategy play by evaluating the success of self and sampled others. In opponent sampling, individuals examine a (random) s…
Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
Simple game (sensu Brown and Vincent, 1987) evolutionary theory, when coupled with social structure measured as non‐random encounter of strategy “clones”, often permits equilibrium refinement leading to Pareto superior outcomes (e.g., Axelrod, 1981; Myerson et al., 1991), a foundational goal of economic game theory (Myerson, 1991: 370–375). This conclusion, derived from analyses of one‐shot and infinitely repeated games, fails for finitely repeat…
Gambling in a Malthusian Universe
Prospect choice is generally viewed as a game against nature. This article models prospect choice as an n- person game where each subject assumes that n- 1 others will be exposed to the same decision problem (prospect choice set) as self; the goal is not to "beat nature" but to do relatively better than rivals exposed to the same problem. Preference becomes strategy choice in n- person Nash equilibrium. When symmetric pure strategy equilibria do …
Evolutionary stability of reciprocity in a viscous lattice
Population structure, spite, and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolutionary stability (sensu Maynard Smith: Evolution and the Theory of Games , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) of TIT FOR TAT (TFT) under the social ecology of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is a function of the number of pure TFT groups (dyads) in the population, relative to the social position of a focal invading defector. Defecting against TFT always raises the defector's relative intragroup fitness; when Axelrod's ( Am. Polit.…
Population structure, spite, and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolutionary stability (sensu Maynard Smith: Evolution and the Theory of Games , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) of TIT FOR TAT (TFT) under the social ecology of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is a function of the number of pure TFT groups (dyads) in the population, relative to the social position of a focal invading defector. Defecting against TFT always raises the defector's relative intragroup fitness; when Axelrod's ( Am. Polit.…
Social Roles as an Effective Learning Mechanism
Using the `Buyer-Seller' game as an idealized form of social interaction across complementary roles, we examine two forms of `myopic learning', where individuals try to improve their response to their immediately past (social) environment. In role sampling, individuals examine a (random) sample of role equivalents, `updating' strategy play by evaluating the success of self and sampled others. In opponent sampling, individuals examine a (random) s…
Gambling in a Malthusian Universe
Prospect choice is generally viewed as a game against nature. This article models prospect choice as an n- person game where each subject assumes that n- 1 others will be exposed to the same decision problem (prospect choice set) as self; the goal is not to "beat nature" but to do relatively better than rivals exposed to the same problem. Preference becomes strategy choice in n- person Nash equilibrium. When symmetric pure strategy equilibria do …
Population structure, spite, and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolutionary stability (sensu Maynard Smith: Evolution and the Theory of Games , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) of TIT FOR TAT (TFT) under the social ecology of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is a function of the number of pure TFT groups (dyads) in the population, relative to the social position of a focal invading defector. Defecting against TFT always raises the defector's relative intragroup fitness; when Axelrod's ( Am. Polit.…
Evolutionary stability of reciprocity in a viscous lattice
Gambling in a Malthusian Universe
Prospect choice is generally viewed as a game against nature. This article models prospect choice as an n- person game where each subject assumes that n- 1 others will be exposed to the same decision problem (prospect choice set) as self; the goal is not to "beat nature" but to do relatively better than rivals exposed to the same problem. Preference becomes strategy choice in n- person Nash equilibrium. When symmetric pure strategy equilibria do …
Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
Simple game (sensu Brown and Vincent, 1987) evolutionary theory, when coupled with social structure measured as non‐random encounter of strategy “clones”, often permits equilibrium refinement leading to Pareto superior outcomes (e.g., Axelrod, 1981; Myerson et al., 1991), a foundational goal of economic game theory (Myerson, 1991: 370–375). This conclusion, derived from analyses of one‐shot and infinitely repeated games, fails for finitely repeat…
Social Roles as an Effective Learning Mechanism
Using the `Buyer-Seller' game as an idealized form of social interaction across complementary roles, we examine two forms of `myopic learning', where individuals try to improve their response to their immediately past (social) environment. In role sampling, individuals examine a (random) sample of role equivalents, `updating' strategy play by evaluating the success of self and sampled others. In opponent sampling, individuals examine a (random) s…
Kin Selective Suicide
Mathematical economics (5 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Game theory (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Nash equilibrium (3 works) · Population (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works)