Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10142434 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gregory B Pollock (Arizona State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 55-72 |
| Publication date | 1995-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0022250x.1995.9990152 |
| OpenAlex | W2022484844 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 49 |
Simple game (sensu Brown and Vincent, 1987) evolutionary theory, when coupled with social structure measured as non‐random encounter of strategy “clones”, often permits equilibrium refinement leading to Pareto superior outcomes (e.g., Axelrod, 1981; Myerson et al., 1991), a foundational goal of economic game theory (Myerson, 1991: 370–375). This conclusion, derived from analyses of one‐shot and infinitely repeated games, fails for finitely repeated games. While mutant cluster invasion enhances Pareto efficiency of equilibria in the former, it can depress Pareto efficiency in the latter. Cooperative equilibria of finitely repeated games (under economic analysis) can be susceptible to cluster‐invasion by even more Pareto efficient strategies which are not themselves evolutionarily stable. Evolutionary (simple) game theory's ability to eliminate Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium strategies induces vulnerabilities foreign to economic analysis. Simple game analysis of finitely repeated games suggests that social structure, modeled as perennial invasion by mutant‐clusters, can induce cyclic invasion, saturation, and loss of cooperation
Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Nash equilibrium · Pareto efficiency · Pareto principle · Repeated game · Simple (philosophy · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics
Man and beast
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Reputation and imperfect information
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Sequential Equilibria
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
The chain store paradox
End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach
Theory and Research in Organizational Ecology
Evolutionary stability of reciprocity in a viscous lattice
The Possibility of Cooperation
Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory
The ecology of organizational size distributions
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
The Evolution of New Organizational Forms
Advances in Evolutionary Culture Theory
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |