James W Boudreau
Biographic Data
| ID | 2069729 |
|---|---|
| NAME | James W Boudreau |
| GIVEN NAMES | James W |
| FAMILY NAME | Boudreau |
| SIGNATURE | BOUDREAU J W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Kennesaw State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2917-2669 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Damaging conflict
The role of luck in political and economic competition
Rule selection invariance as a robustness check in collective choice and nonparametric statistical settings
Tullock contest alliances with proportional prize-sharing agreements
Spelling Bees
In this note, we consider a form of competition in which two contestants face separate sequences of independent trials. The contestant with the longer sequence of successful trials wins. However, since the trials are independent, there may be a form of paradox whereby the loser is able to pass all of the trials in the winner's sequence, whereas the winner could not have overcome two or more trials in the loser's sequence. We refer to this as the …
The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts
Stag hunt contests and alliance formation
The likelihood of social choice violations in rank sum scoring
What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
Social choice violations in rank sum scoring
Dividing profits three ways
Stag hunt contests and alliance formation
The likelihood of social choice violations in rank sum scoring
Social choice violations in rank sum scoring
Rule selection invariance as a robustness check in collective choice and nonparametric statistical settings
Tullock contest alliances with proportional prize-sharing agreements
The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts
The role of luck in political and economic competition
Dividing profits three ways
What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
Social choice violations in rank sum scoring
The likelihood of social choice violations in rank sum scoring
The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts
Stag hunt contests and alliance formation
The role of luck in political and economic competition
Rule selection invariance as a robustness check in collective choice and nonparametric statistical settings
Tullock contest alliances with proportional prize-sharing agreements
Spelling Bees
In this note, we consider a form of competition in which two contestants face separate sequences of independent trials. The contestant with the longer sequence of successful trials wins. However, since the trials are independent, there may be a form of paradox whereby the loser is able to pass all of the trials in the winner's sequence, whereas the winner could not have overcome two or more trials in the loser's sequence. We refer to this as the …
Damaging conflict
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Economics (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Econometrics (5 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Statistics (4 works)