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Damaging conflict

All-pay auctions with negative spillovers and bimodal bidding

Bibliographic Data

ID7177140
AuthorsJames W Boudreau (0000-0003-2917-2669, Kennesaw State University, corresponding author), Kristy Buzard (Syracuse University), Timothy Mathews (0000-0002-1204-8365, Kennesaw State University), Lucas Rentschler (0000-0001-9470-8752, Utah State University), Susan Sanders (0000-0002-8506-2619, Syracuse University), Shane D Sanders
Year2025
Volume239
Pages107255-107255
Publication date2025-10-03
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0167-2681 • E-ISSN: 1879-1751
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107255
OpenAlexW4414778632
LanguageEN
References cited29

Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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