Matthew Fulkerson
Biographic Data
| ID | 2099502 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Fulkerson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Fulkerson |
| SIGNATURE | FULKERSON M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0761-5537 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Pain and psychological integration
The scientific investigation of pain faces many challenges. I argue that one of the central challenges posed by pain – its inherent complexity and supposed idiosyncrasy – is best understood as an instance of a more general issue in the mind sciences: the problem of psychological integration. This label is not yet an explanation or account of the underlying challenge, but rather a more precise, empirically tractable formulation of the worry as it …
A new obstacle for phenomenal contrast
Phenomenal Contrast Arguments (PCAs) are a prominent method in philosophy of mind for, among other uses, investigating how specific mental features shape the phenomenal character of experience. This paper identifies a general and underexplored obstacle to the success of PCAs: The necessity of demonstrating that the contrasts employed in these arguments are genuinely phenomenal, rather than merely cognitive or otherwise non-phenomenal. We contend …
How thirst compels
Many sensory states motivate. I offer an account of how such states compel intentional action. I focus on thirst as it is relatively simple in physiological and behavioral terms, it carries little theoretical baggage, and the motivational story for thirst seems likely to generalize. I argue that thirst motivates using a variety of flexible strategies, and that no single explanatory mechanism fully captures its motivational force. The resulting vi…
First Sense
It is through touch that we are able to interact directly with the world; it is our primary conduit of both pleasure and pain. Touch may be our most immediate and powerful sense -- "the first sense" because of the central role it plays in experience. In this book, Matthew Fulkerson proposes that human touch, despite its functional diversity, is a single, unified sensory modality. Fulkerson offers a philosophical account of touch, reflecting the i…
No prominent works on this page.
First Sense
It is through touch that we are able to interact directly with the world; it is our primary conduit of both pleasure and pain. Touch may be our most immediate and powerful sense -- "the first sense" because of the central role it plays in experience. In this book, Matthew Fulkerson proposes that human touch, despite its functional diversity, is a single, unified sensory modality. Fulkerson offers a philosophical account of touch, reflecting the i…
How thirst compels
Many sensory states motivate. I offer an account of how such states compel intentional action. I focus on thirst as it is relatively simple in physiological and behavioral terms, it carries little theoretical baggage, and the motivational story for thirst seems likely to generalize. I argue that thirst motivates using a variety of flexible strategies, and that no single explanatory mechanism fully captures its motivational force. The resulting vi…
A new obstacle for phenomenal contrast
Phenomenal Contrast Arguments (PCAs) are a prominent method in philosophy of mind for, among other uses, investigating how specific mental features shape the phenomenal character of experience. This paper identifies a general and underexplored obstacle to the success of PCAs: The necessity of demonstrating that the contrasts employed in these arguments are genuinely phenomenal, rather than merely cognitive or otherwise non-phenomenal. We contend …
Pain and psychological integration
The scientific investigation of pain faces many challenges. I argue that one of the central challenges posed by pain – its inherent complexity and supposed idiosyncrasy – is best understood as an instance of a more general issue in the mind sciences: the problem of psychological integration. This label is not yet an explanation or account of the underlying challenge, but rather a more precise, empirically tractable formulation of the worry as it …
Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Olfactory and Sensory Function Studies (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (1 work)