A new obstacle for phenomenal contrast

Bibliographic Data

ID10344379
AuthorsMatthew Fulkerson (0000-0003-0761-5537, University of California San Diego), Jonathan Cohen (0009-0004-3061-9020, University of California San Diego)
Year2025
Publication date2025-02-03
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaf009
OpenAlexW4407081447
LanguageEN
References cited27

Phenomenal Contrast Arguments (PCAs) are a prominent method in philosophy of mind for, among other uses, investigating how specific mental features shape the phenomenal character of experience. This paper identifies a general and underexplored obstacle to the success of PCAs: The necessity of demonstrating that the contrasts employed in these arguments are genuinely phenomenal, rather than merely cognitive or otherwise non-phenomenal. We contend that proponents of PCAs often assume a phenomenal difference without adequately ruling out these alternative explanations for the available contrast. While we do not preclude the possibility of successful PCAs, our arguments suggest that many existing instances fail to meet this burden

Character (mathematics · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Contrast (vision · Epistemology · Obstacle · Political science · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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