Diana I Pérez

Biographic Data

ID216531
NAMEDiana I Pérez
GIVEN NAMESDiana I
FAMILY NAMEPérez
SIGNATUREPÉREZ D I
AFFILIATIONSConsejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
ORCID0000-0002-6185-7986
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR10
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2005
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX1

  • La IA entre nosotros

    Open AccessDiana I PérezARTICLEResonancias Revista de Filosofía2024

    En este trabajo me concentro en las formas en las que los seres humanos interactuamos con los sistemas con IA actualmente existentes en nuestras sociedades. Muestro que son cierto tipo de formas de interacción las que están a la base de la consideración de tales sistemas como “inteligentes” dado el origen mismo del desarrollo de la IA en base al “Test de Turing”. Distingo dos tipos de desarrollos y sus efectos, tomando como criterios las formas d…

  • La Segunda Persona Y La Teoría De La Mente

    Open AccessDiana I PérezARTICLERevista Ideação2022

    El propósito de este trabajo es identificar el rol le podemos asignar a la así llamada teoría de la mente (ToM) en el marco de la perspectiva de segunda persona de la atribución mental (P2P). En el primer apartado explicitaré diferentes concepciones de ToM, y en el segundo señalaré las dificultades que enfrenta. En la tercera parte del trabajo presentaré sintéticamente algunas ideas nucleares de la P2P, y finalmente en la última sección mostraré …

  • Natural Born Transhumans

    Open AccessKarina Silvia Pedace, Karina Pedace et al.ARTICLERevista de Filosofia Aurora2020

    This work promotes the thesis that humans are naturally transhuman. In order to achieve this, we present in the first two sections some examples of technological devices assembled to human beings, and we critically review the assumptions and dichotomies on which the idea of human enhancement is based according to the ordinary transhumanist vision. Thirdly, we present the thesis of the Extended Mind to support our intuition. Fourthly, we dismantle…

  • The Interactive Origin and the Aesthetic Modelling of Image-Schemas and Primary Metaphors

    Open AccessIsabel Cecilia Martínez, Silvia Español et al.ARTICLEIntegrative Psychological and…2018Cited by: 1References: 11

  • The Will to Communicate

    Open AccessDiana I PérezARTICLECritica2013

    In this paper I discuss Rodriguez-Pereyra’s claim according to which analytical philosophy should be published exclusively in English. I focus my reply on three issues: (1) the implicit conception of philosophy and of the philosophical practice that underlies his argument, (2) the myth of the “native speaker” and (3) some values that should guide philosophy and which I propose to highlight

  • Guillermo Hurtado, Por qué no soy falibilista y otros ensayos filosóficos

    Open AccessDiana I PérezARTICLECritica2011

    Guillermo Hurtado, Por qué no soy falibilista y otros ensayos filosóficos, Los Libros de Homero, México, 2009, 87 pp

  • The Ontology of Art

    Diana I PérezARTICLECR The New Centennial Review2011

    Research Article| March 01 2011 The Ontology of Art: What Can We Learn from Borges’s "Menard"? Diana I. Pérez Diana I. Pérez Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google CR: The New Centennial Review (2011) 11 (1): 75-89. https://doi.org/10.2307/41949728 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Diana I. Pérez; The Ontology of Art: What Can We Learn from Borges’s "Menard"?. CR:…

  • Conceptos fenoménicos, conceptos psicológicos y la explicación de la conciencia

    Open AccessDiana I PérezARTICLECritica2009

    Peter Carruthers, Consciousness. Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 247 pp

  • The Nonconceptual Contents of our Minds

    Diana I Pérez, ProtoSociology ProjectARTICLEProtoSociology2006

  • Mysteries and Scandals. Transcendental Naturalism and the Future of Philosophy

    Open AccessDiana I PérezARTICLECritica2005

    In this paper I shall discuss McGinn's transcendental naturalism (TN) and the reasons he gives in order to show that philosophy will always be just a cluster of mysteries without answers. I shall show that the three main arguments he gives for TN are inconclusive and that a modular architecture of the mind he presupposes is not committed to the epistemic thesis of TN, the idea that we are "cognitively closed" to answering some questions about con…