Janis David Schaab
Biographic Data
| ID | 2201193 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Janis David Schaab |
| GIVEN NAMES | Janis David |
| FAMILY NAME | Schaab |
| SIGNATURE | SCHAAB J D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Human Abilities Research Centre, Berlin |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1776-2437 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Conspiracy Theories and Rational Critique: A Kantian Procedural Approach
The bottom line of the philosophical debate about conspiracy theories is that it is difficult to condemn belief in conspiracy theories as rationally criticisable in general. Yet, we should not give up on the project of providing a general rational critique of such belief, not least because of the threat it poses to society. For this reason, I outline a new kind of approach that aims to show that conspiracy theories are rationally criticisable in …
Moral Obligation: Relational or Second-Personal
The Problem of Obligation is the problem of how to explain the features of moral obligations that distinguish them from other normative phenomena. Two recent accounts, the Second-Personal Account and the Relational Account, propose superficially similar solutions to this problem. Both regard obligations as based on the legitimate claims or demands that persons as such have on one another. However, unlike the Second-Personal Account, the Relationa…
Second-Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation
According to second-personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second-personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second-personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second-personal relations, which has consequences for the nature …
Kant and the Second Person
According to Stephen Darwall's second-personal account, moral obligations constitutively involve relations of authority and accountability between persons. Darwall takes this account to lend support to Immanuel Kant's moral theory. Critics object that the second-personal account abandons central tenets of Kant's system. I respond to the three main challenges that critics offer by showing that they rest on misunderstandings of the second-personal …
On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself
An influential argument against the possibility of obligations to oneself states that the very notion of such obligations is incoherent: If there were such obligations, we could release ourselves from them; yet releasing oneself from an obligation is impossible. I challenge this argument by arguing against the premise that it is impossible to release oneself from an obligation. I point out that this premise assumes that if it were possible to rel…
Why it is Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory
The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be …
Second-Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation
According to second-personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second-personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second-personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second-personal relations, which has consequences for the nature …
Why it is Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory
The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be …
Kant and the Second Person
According to Stephen Darwall's second-personal account, moral obligations constitutively involve relations of authority and accountability between persons. Darwall takes this account to lend support to Immanuel Kant's moral theory. Critics object that the second-personal account abandons central tenets of Kant's system. I respond to the three main challenges that critics offer by showing that they rest on misunderstandings of the second-personal …
On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself
An influential argument against the possibility of obligations to oneself states that the very notion of such obligations is incoherent: If there were such obligations, we could release ourselves from them; yet releasing oneself from an obligation is impossible. I challenge this argument by arguing against the premise that it is impossible to release oneself from an obligation. I point out that this premise assumes that if it were possible to rel…
Moral Obligation: Relational or Second-Personal
The Problem of Obligation is the problem of how to explain the features of moral obligations that distinguish them from other normative phenomena. Two recent accounts, the Second-Personal Account and the Relational Account, propose superficially similar solutions to this problem. Both regard obligations as based on the legitimate claims or demands that persons as such have on one another. However, unlike the Second-Personal Account, the Relationa…
Second-Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation
According to second-personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second-personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second-personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second-personal relations, which has consequences for the nature …
Conspiracy Theories and Rational Critique: A Kantian Procedural Approach
The bottom line of the philosophical debate about conspiracy theories is that it is difficult to condemn belief in conspiracy theories as rationally criticisable in general. Yet, we should not give up on the project of providing a general rational critique of such belief, not least because of the threat it poses to society. For this reason, I outline a new kind of approach that aims to show that conspiracy theories are rationally criticisable in …
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Moral obligation (3 works) · Obligation (3 works)