Second-Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4877913 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Janis David Schaab (0000-0002-1776-2437, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2023-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12901 |
| OpenAlex | W4317840245 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 64 |
According to second-personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second-personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second-personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second-personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their respective advantages and disadvantages, and thereby indicate avenues for future research
Epistemology · Moral obligation · Normative · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
Honor, History, and Relationship
The Ethical Demand
Testimony, Trust, and Authority
The moral psychology of obligation
Why it is Disrespectful to Violate Rights
XI-Why is it Disrespectful to Violate Rights?
Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual
The Nature of Claim-Rights
Immanuel Kant
Duty to Self
Kant and the Second Person
On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself
The Possibility of Practical Reason
Practical Reason and Norms
The Right and the Good
Modern Moral Philosophy
Second-Personal Reasons and Moral Obligations
Two Concepts of Rules
Relational Primitivism
Precis
Reply to Schapiro, Smith/Strabbing, and Yaffe
Desires as Demands
For Oneself and Toward Another
Other wills
Am I You
Second-personal morality” and morality
Naturalizing Darwall’s Second Person Standpoint
The nature and value of rights
Directed Duties
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |