W Mark Crain
Biographic Data
| ID | 2368418 |
|---|---|
| NAME | W Mark Crain |
| GIVEN NAMES | W Mark |
| FAMILY NAME | Crain |
| SIGNATURE | CRAIN W M |
| AFFILIATIONS | George Mason University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 104 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 16 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1976 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Robert’s Rules for a knowledge-creating society
Determinants of publication productivity
Terrorized economies
Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States
Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance
Legislative organization and government spending
Committee characteristics and re-election margins
Legislative committees as loyalty-generating institutions
The Probability of Being President
Economic models of politics typically use the expected value of a candidate's vote share to proxy electoral probability. In this paper, the authors introduce a risk calculation to augment the evaluation of a candidate's (or party's) expected vote share and they divide this risk element into its systematic and unsystematic components. For the same reason that systematic risk is a primary focus of portfolio management, the authors discover that an …
The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy
The size and number of political interest groups is analyzed using the firm-industry framework of standard microeconomic theory. The model allows for the entry and exit of interest groups in the interest-group industry, as well as adjustments in the size of individual interest groups. The structural characteristics of the market for legislation (i.e., the costs of procuring influence) drives these adjustments in political coalitions and interest …
Laissez-faire in campaign finance
Voting and not voting at the same time
Legislator specialization and the size of government
A note on political participation as consumption behavior
On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets
This paper considers an organizational aspect of the market in which votes are exchanged for public-policy outcomes. Specifically, the effect on the stability and behavior of politicians of assigning the demanders of political products (i.e., voters) to geographic areas is addressed. Implications concerning the locational division of the "buyers" of political outcomes for collusive efforts by existing officeholders to restrict entry are drawn and…
State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors
Legislative committees as loyalty-generating institutions
On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets
This paper considers an organizational aspect of the market in which votes are exchanged for public-policy outcomes. Specifically, the effect on the stability and behavior of politicians of assigning the demanders of political products (i.e., voters) to geographic areas is addressed. Implications concerning the locational division of the "buyers" of political outcomes for collusive efforts by existing officeholders to restrict entry are drawn and…
Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance
Terrorized economies
A note on political participation as consumption behavior
Voting and not voting at the same time
Committee characteristics and re-election margins
State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors
Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States
Legislator specialization and the size of government
Determinants of publication productivity
Laissez-faire in campaign finance
The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy
The size and number of political interest groups is analyzed using the firm-industry framework of standard microeconomic theory. The model allows for the entry and exit of interest groups in the interest-group industry, as well as adjustments in the size of individual interest groups. The structural characteristics of the market for legislation (i.e., the costs of procuring influence) drives these adjustments in political coalitions and interest …
State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors
A note on political participation as consumption behavior
On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets
This paper considers an organizational aspect of the market in which votes are exchanged for public-policy outcomes. Specifically, the effect on the stability and behavior of politicians of assigning the demanders of political products (i.e., voters) to geographic areas is addressed. Implications concerning the locational division of the "buyers" of political outcomes for collusive efforts by existing officeholders to restrict entry are drawn and…
Legislator specialization and the size of government
Voting and not voting at the same time
Laissez-faire in campaign finance
The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy
The size and number of political interest groups is analyzed using the firm-industry framework of standard microeconomic theory. The model allows for the entry and exit of interest groups in the interest-group industry, as well as adjustments in the size of individual interest groups. The structural characteristics of the market for legislation (i.e., the costs of procuring influence) drives these adjustments in political coalitions and interest …
The Probability of Being President
Economic models of politics typically use the expected value of a candidate's vote share to proxy electoral probability. In this paper, the authors introduce a risk calculation to augment the evaluation of a candidate's (or party's) expected vote share and they divide this risk element into its systematic and unsystematic components. For the same reason that systematic risk is a primary focus of portfolio management, the authors discover that an …
Legislative committees as loyalty-generating institutions
Committee characteristics and re-election margins
Legislative organization and government spending
Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance
Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States
Terrorized economies
Determinants of publication productivity
Robert’s Rules for a knowledge-creating society
Economics (14 works) · Political science (14 works) · Law (13 works) · Public finance (11 works) · Macroeconomics (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (8 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (6 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (6 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (6 works)