The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy

Bibliographic Data

ID5917246
AuthorsW Mark Crain (George Mason University, corresponding author), Robert D Tollison (George Mason University), Thomas H Deaton (General Telephone and Electric Company)
Year1991
Volume3
Issue4
Pages437-449
Publication date1991-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRationality and Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1043463191003004004
OpenAlexW2056111187
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited18

The size and number of political interest groups is analyzed using the firm-industry framework of standard microeconomic theory. The model allows for the entry and exit of interest groups in the interest-group industry, as well as adjustments in the size of individual interest groups. The structural characteristics of the market for legislation (i.e., the costs of procuring influence) drives these adjustments in political coalitions and interest groups. Empirical evidence on the relationship of coalition adjustments to changes in various characteristics of legislatures is provided using data on U.S. states

Economics · Interest group · Interest rate · Legislation · Legislature · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Special Interest Group · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Transport and Economic Policies

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