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Laura I Langbein

Biographic Data

ID2536135
NAMELaura I Langbein
GIVEN NAMESLaura I
FAMILY NAMELangbein
SIGNATURELANGBEIN L I
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS11
TOTAL CITATIONS178
WORKS AS AUTHOR11
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1981
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2002
H-INDEX4
  • Responsive bureaus, equity, and regulatory negotiation

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•2002•Cited by: 4•References: 10

    Rulemaking agencies commonly delegate the implementation and enforcement of rules to affected parties, but they rarely delegate rulemaking authority. Regulatory negotiation is an example of this uncommon behavior. Compared to conventional rulemaking, regulatory negotiation is thought to be an attempt to make bureaucracy more responsive to affected stakeholders, especially when the rulemaking concerns politically complicated and technical issues. …

  • Ownership, empowerment, and productivity

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•2000•References: 14

    This paper uses a sample of professional engineers employed in the public and private sector to investigate the effect of sector employment, indicators of task complexity, organization size, number of rules, importance, and attentiveness and agreement among various principals (customers or clients, peers, mid- and top-level management, and politicians) on both employee discretion and a subjective measure of employee productivity. The results show…

  • Rethinking ward and at-large elections in cities

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 12•References: 29

  • Shirking and Ideology

    Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 32

    A repeated finding in political science is the influence of a representative's so-called ideology on roll call voting in the U.S. House and Senate. Many of these studies attempt explicitly to separate the impact on roll call voting of "personal" ideology from that of constituency ideological preferences. In these studies, personal ideology is viewed as a form of shirking in which members pursue their own policy preferences rather than those of th…

  • Grounded Beefs

    Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein et al.•ARTICLE•Public Administration Review•1994

    Recently in an attempt to improve the quality and appearance of airport food and merchandise, both concessionaires and airport officials have made a concentrated effort to change the way they do business (Weinstein and Madrigal, 1991; Finney, 1991) They are shying away from selling hackneyed tourist items and stale hotdogs. They are changing the type of merchandise they carry and are offering brand name products. Wellknown merchandise is replacin…

  • The Validity of Student Evaluations of Teaching

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button

  • PACs, lobbies and political conflict

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 11•References: 20

  • The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1990•Cited by: 49•References: 22

    This paper sheds empirical light on the effectiveness of both sides of the gun lobby in affecting votes in the House on the McClure-Volkmer bill. It examines the impact of elite and grass roots lobbying, in addition to the influence of campaign contributions. The results show that, at least on this issue, the NRA's and Handgun Control's prevote campaign contributions affected member's subsequent votes, even when other variables, including ideolog…

  • Money and Access

    Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1986•Cited by: 99•References: 12

    Political scientists have pointed out that access is an important motivation for campaign contributions, but their evidence to date is based largely on case study observations, on the opinions of participants and observers, and on inferences from indirect quantitative evidence. This paper provides more direct quantitative evidence on the topic, using data from the Commission on Administrative Review of the House of Representatives in the 95th Con…

  • The Section 8-Existing Housing program's administrative fee structure

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1982•References: 6

  • Program Evaluation

    Theodore H Poister, Sar A Levitan et al.•ARTICLE•Public Administration Review•1981•Cited by: 1

  • Money and Access

    Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1986•Cited by: 99•References: 12

    Political scientists have pointed out that access is an important motivation for campaign contributions, but their evidence to date is based largely on case study observations, on the opinions of participants and observers, and on inferences from indirect quantitative evidence. This paper provides more direct quantitative evidence on the topic, using data from the Commission on Administrative Review of the House of Representatives in the 95th Con…

  • The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1990•Cited by: 49•References: 22

    This paper sheds empirical light on the effectiveness of both sides of the gun lobby in affecting votes in the House on the McClure-Volkmer bill. It examines the impact of elite and grass roots lobbying, in addition to the influence of campaign contributions. The results show that, at least on this issue, the NRA's and Handgun Control's prevote campaign contributions affected member's subsequent votes, even when other variables, including ideolog…

  • Rethinking ward and at-large elections in cities

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 12•References: 29

  • PACs, lobbies and political conflict

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 11•References: 20

  • Responsive bureaus, equity, and regulatory negotiation

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•2002•Cited by: 4•References: 10

    Rulemaking agencies commonly delegate the implementation and enforcement of rules to affected parties, but they rarely delegate rulemaking authority. Regulatory negotiation is an example of this uncommon behavior. Compared to conventional rulemaking, regulatory negotiation is thought to be an attempt to make bureaucracy more responsive to affected stakeholders, especially when the rulemaking concerns politically complicated and technical issues. …

  • Shirking and Ideology

    Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 32

    A repeated finding in political science is the influence of a representative's so-called ideology on roll call voting in the U.S. House and Senate. Many of these studies attempt explicitly to separate the impact on roll call voting of "personal" ideology from that of constituency ideological preferences. In these studies, personal ideology is viewed as a form of shirking in which members pursue their own policy preferences rather than those of th…

  • The Validity of Student Evaluations of Teaching

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button

  • Program Evaluation

    Theodore H Poister, Sar A Levitan et al.•ARTICLE•Public Administration Review•1981•Cited by: 1

  • Program Evaluation

    Theodore H Poister, Sar A Levitan et al.•ARTICLE•Public Administration Review•1981•Cited by: 1

  • The Section 8-Existing Housing program's administrative fee structure

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1982•References: 6

  • Money and Access

    Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1986•Cited by: 99•References: 12

    Political scientists have pointed out that access is an important motivation for campaign contributions, but their evidence to date is based largely on case study observations, on the opinions of participants and observers, and on inferences from indirect quantitative evidence. This paper provides more direct quantitative evidence on the topic, using data from the Commission on Administrative Review of the House of Representatives in the 95th Con…

  • The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1990•Cited by: 49•References: 22

    This paper sheds empirical light on the effectiveness of both sides of the gun lobby in affecting votes in the House on the McClure-Volkmer bill. It examines the impact of elite and grass roots lobbying, in addition to the influence of campaign contributions. The results show that, at least on this issue, the NRA's and Handgun Control's prevote campaign contributions affected member's subsequent votes, even when other variables, including ideolog…

  • PACs, lobbies and political conflict

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 11•References: 20

  • Grounded Beefs

    Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein et al.•ARTICLE•Public Administration Review•1994

    Recently in an attempt to improve the quality and appearance of airport food and merchandise, both concessionaires and airport officials have made a concentrated effort to change the way they do business (Weinstein and Madrigal, 1991; Finney, 1991) They are shying away from selling hackneyed tourist items and stale hotdogs. They are changing the type of merchandise they carry and are offering brand name products. Wellknown merchandise is replacin…

  • The Validity of Student Evaluations of Teaching

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 10

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button

  • Shirking and Ideology

    Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 32

    A repeated finding in political science is the influence of a representative's so-called ideology on roll call voting in the U.S. House and Senate. Many of these studies attempt explicitly to separate the impact on roll call voting of "personal" ideology from that of constituency ideological preferences. In these studies, personal ideology is viewed as a form of shirking in which members pursue their own policy preferences rather than those of th…

  • Rethinking ward and at-large elections in cities

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 12•References: 29

  • Ownership, empowerment, and productivity

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•2000•References: 14

    This paper uses a sample of professional engineers employed in the public and private sector to investigate the effect of sector employment, indicators of task complexity, organization size, number of rules, importance, and attentiveness and agreement among various principals (customers or clients, peers, mid- and top-level management, and politicians) on both employee discretion and a subjective measure of employee productivity. The results show…

  • Responsive bureaus, equity, and regulatory negotiation

    Open Access•Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•2002•Cited by: 4•References: 10

    Rulemaking agencies commonly delegate the implementation and enforcement of rules to affected parties, but they rarely delegate rulemaking authority. Regulatory negotiation is an example of this uncommon behavior. Compared to conventional rulemaking, regulatory negotiation is thought to be an attempt to make bureaucracy more responsive to affected stakeholders, especially when the rulemaking concerns politically complicated and technical issues. …

Political science (10 works) · Economics (9 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Public economics (6 works) · Politics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Empirical evidence (3 works)

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