Shirking and Ideology
Defense in the Senate
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6182974 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein (0000-0003-3899-1543, American University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 35-55 |
| Publication date | 1995-03-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Congress & the Presidency (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0734-3469 • E-ISSN: 1944-1053 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/07343469509507864 |
| OpenAlex | W2079339542 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 35 |
A repeated finding in political science is the influence of a representative's so-called ideology on roll call voting in the U.S. House and Senate. Many of these studies attempt explicitly to separate the impact on roll call voting of "personal" ideology from that of constituency ideological preferences. In these studies, personal ideology is viewed as a form of shirking in which members pursue their own policy preferences rather than those of their constituents. This paper shows, at least for the case of defense in the Senate in the 1980s, that the evidence is sufficient to reject the claim that shirking represents the consumption of personal ideological policy preferences. Instead, the apparent impact of shirking on defense voting was an instrumental, reelection-oriented response to President Reagan's ability to muster popular support for his defense build up, and thus cannot be regarded as shirking at all
Economics · Ideology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Roll call · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Social Media and Politics
Multiple Regression in Practice
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting
The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators
A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting
Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting
The Rationality of Ideology
Home Style
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting
Predicting State Abortion Legislation From U.S. Senate Votes
Shirking, representation, and Congressional behavior
Ideology, voting, and shirking
Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives
Ideology, ?shirking?, and representation
Constituency characteristics and legislative preferences
On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking
A test for pure or apparent ideology in congressional voting
The ideological component of Senate voting
Constituencies and Leaders in Congress
An Errors-in-Variables Approach to Estimating Models with Small Area Data
The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money
On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress
Linking Constituency Opinion and Senate Voting Scores
Parochialism, Policy, and Constituency Constraints
Election Proximity and Senatorial Roll Call Voting
Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes
The ABM Issue in the Senate, 1968-1970
A Method of Estimating the Personal Ideology of Political Representatives
Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States
Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making
Legislators and Interest Groups
| Citations per year | 0.07 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 1998 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |