Tor Bukkvoll
Biographic Data
| ID | 258590 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tor Bukkvoll |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tor |
| FAMILY NAME | Bukkvoll |
| SIGNATURE | BUKKVOLL T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Norwegian Defence Research Establishment |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 51 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Failures in Ukrainian Arms Procurement 2014–2023
This article discusses critical failures in Ukrainian defense production and procurement in the period 2014 to 2023. The main puzzle is why Ukraine did so little to satisfy the needs of the country’s armed forces in essential segments of military capabilities when there seems to have been no disagreement on their necessity. Furthermore, both technological and financial resources appear to have been present. The main argument is that Ukraine’s sta…
War and the Willingness to Resist and Fight in Ukraine
This study explores the effects of Russia's use of military force on the Ukrainian willingness to fight and resist. We find assumptions from the theoretical literature on the willingness to fight of limited relevance. Instead, our analysis suggests that Ukrainian willingness to fight and resist correlates with (1) a growth in Ukrainian civic nationalism; (2) an increase in trust in Ukrainian political institutions, particularly the Ukrainian arme…
Private military companies - Russian great power politics on the cheap
In a situation where the Russian national self-image and economic realities fail to add up, this article discusses whether Russian private military companies have become low-cost tools to restore Russian great power status. Our findings suggest that whenever these companies are used in a ‘power as outcome’ way, they appear less successful at adding great power status on the cheap and less useful at elite enrichment. In contrast, PMCs seem well su…
The threat of war and domestic restraints to defence reform- how fear of major military conflict changed and did not change the Ukrainian military 2014-2019
The annexation of Crimea and the Russia enabled rebellion in Donbas created a need for radical improvements of Ukrainian military capability. This study discusses how different, mostly domestic, reform drivers and reform impeding factors had impact on the pace of Ukrainian top-down defence reform in the period since the confrontation with Russia started in 2014. It concludes that reform has been uneven, and that while vested organizational intere…
Fighting on behalf of the state—the issue of pro-government militia autonomy in the Donbas war
This study investigates the degree of autonomy the Ukrainian volunteer battalions had from the regular forces during the war in Donbas. The findings indicate that the degree of autonomy was high and that in particular, three initial conditions were decisive for this outcome: (1) the relative level of militia military strength in the initial states of conflict; (2) the degree of agenda overlap; (3) the degree of bottom-up organization. The empiric…
Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas
Special operations forces have played an important role in Russian warfare against Ukraine. In Crimea, they engaged in mostly covert action tasks, whereas in Donbas they engaged in more regular special operations functions such as special reconnaissance, military assistance, and direct action. The annexation of Crimea was the first time in which the new Special Operations Command took on a leading role. Based on the Ukrainian experience, there is…
Why Putin went to war: Ideology, interests and decision-making in the Russian use of force in Crimea and Donbas
Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the country's prominent role in instigating and supporting an anti-Kiev rebellion in Donbas, surprised the world. This study seeks to explain Russian behaviour in these two cases. Because of the recent nature of events, there is so far not an abundance of reliable sources. Thus, some of the findings in this study should be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive. It is argued that dominating Russian axiom…
Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government – the Case of Russian Special Operations Forces
Russian Special Forces saw significant changes to both organization and doctrine in the years after 2008. The special forces of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate were reduced in number, the organization’s institutional autonomy and rationale were changed, and an entirely new Special Operations Command was established in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the nature, scope and purpose of these changes, and to explain them by …
Iron Cannot Fight 1 – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory
Contemporary Russian military theory is dominated by three schools of thought: the ‘traditionalists’, the ‘modernists’ and the ‘revolutionaries’. On the role of technology in future warfare, the traditionalists argue for both high tech and massive forces at the same time. The modernists are ready to trade manpower for technology, whereas the revolutionaries give technology full priority. Both the traditionalists and the modernists believe Russia,…
Their Hands in the Till: Scale and Causes of Russian Military Corruption
The change from Yeltsin to Putin has had minimal effect on Russian military corruption. Putin, despite his desire to rebuild Russian strength, has not shown himself willing or able to seriously deal with this problem. The fluctuations in the level of military corruption in the post-Soviet period seem largely to be explained by changes in availability of things to steal or embezzle. Thus, the latter years' substantial increases in defense spending…
Private Interests, Public Policy: Ukraine and the Common Economic Space Agreement
Ukrainian foreign policy maintains a delicate balance between private, factional, and national interests
Astana's Privatised Independence: Private and National Interests in the Foreign Policy of Nursultan Nazarbayev
Nursultan Nazarbayev has been President of Kazakhstan since that country became independent in 1991. Observers expect him to remain in his current position until 2013, and there are clear indications that he has started to prepare for his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, to take over power after 2013. Analyses of Kazakhstan's foreign policy therefore both has had and will continue to have a close focus on the person of Nursultan Nazarbayev. In addit…
Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy
Russia’s new strategic partnership with the West has both international and domestic causes. In terms of domestic causes, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and James Lee Ray propose that domestic interest groups are likely to have a particular impact on foreign policy in semi-democratic states such as Russia. This is because the political leadership is more dependent on satisfying these group interests than on providing for public/national interests in ord…
Arming the Ayatollahs: Economic Lobbies in Russia’s Iran Policy
Powerful special interest groups influence Russian policy on the sale of arms to Iran
Off the Cuff Politics—Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy
THERE IS A BLATANT PARADOX in Russia's policy towards Ukraine. On the one hand, there are few discussions that bring out more consensus across the Russian political spectrum than discussions of Russian-Ukrainian relations. On the other hand, Russia was not at any time during the first 10 years of Ukrainian independence able to produce a co-ordinated political strategy for the conduct of relations with her southern neighbour. The recent appointmen…
Ukraine and Nato
Book Notes
Book Notes
Book Notes
Book Notes
Why Putin went to war: Ideology, interests and decision-making in the Russian use of force in Crimea and Donbas
Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the country's prominent role in instigating and supporting an anti-Kiev rebellion in Donbas, surprised the world. This study seeks to explain Russian behaviour in these two cases. Because of the recent nature of events, there is so far not an abundance of reliable sources. Thus, some of the findings in this study should be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive. It is argued that dominating Russian axiom…
Off the Cuff Politics—Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy
THERE IS A BLATANT PARADOX in Russia's policy towards Ukraine. On the one hand, there are few discussions that bring out more consensus across the Russian political spectrum than discussions of Russian-Ukrainian relations. On the other hand, Russia was not at any time during the first 10 years of Ukrainian independence able to produce a co-ordinated political strategy for the conduct of relations with her southern neighbour. The recent appointmen…
Fighting on behalf of the state—the issue of pro-government militia autonomy in the Donbas war
This study investigates the degree of autonomy the Ukrainian volunteer battalions had from the regular forces during the war in Donbas. The findings indicate that the degree of autonomy was high and that in particular, three initial conditions were decisive for this outcome: (1) the relative level of militia military strength in the initial states of conflict; (2) the degree of agenda overlap; (3) the degree of bottom-up organization. The empiric…
War and the Willingness to Resist and Fight in Ukraine
This study explores the effects of Russia's use of military force on the Ukrainian willingness to fight and resist. We find assumptions from the theoretical literature on the willingness to fight of limited relevance. Instead, our analysis suggests that Ukrainian willingness to fight and resist correlates with (1) a growth in Ukrainian civic nationalism; (2) an increase in trust in Ukrainian political institutions, particularly the Ukrainian arme…
Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government – the Case of Russian Special Operations Forces
Russian Special Forces saw significant changes to both organization and doctrine in the years after 2008. The special forces of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate were reduced in number, the organization’s institutional autonomy and rationale were changed, and an entirely new Special Operations Command was established in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the nature, scope and purpose of these changes, and to explain them by …
Iron Cannot Fight 1 – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory
Contemporary Russian military theory is dominated by three schools of thought: the ‘traditionalists’, the ‘modernists’ and the ‘revolutionaries’. On the role of technology in future warfare, the traditionalists argue for both high tech and massive forces at the same time. The modernists are ready to trade manpower for technology, whereas the revolutionaries give technology full priority. Both the traditionalists and the modernists believe Russia,…
Private Interests, Public Policy: Ukraine and the Common Economic Space Agreement
Ukrainian foreign policy maintains a delicate balance between private, factional, and national interests
Arming the Ayatollahs: Economic Lobbies in Russia’s Iran Policy
Powerful special interest groups influence Russian policy on the sale of arms to Iran
Private military companies - Russian great power politics on the cheap
In a situation where the Russian national self-image and economic realities fail to add up, this article discusses whether Russian private military companies have become low-cost tools to restore Russian great power status. Our findings suggest that whenever these companies are used in a ‘power as outcome’ way, they appear less successful at adding great power status on the cheap and less useful at elite enrichment. In contrast, PMCs seem well su…
Astana's Privatised Independence: Private and National Interests in the Foreign Policy of Nursultan Nazarbayev
Nursultan Nazarbayev has been President of Kazakhstan since that country became independent in 1991. Observers expect him to remain in his current position until 2013, and there are clear indications that he has started to prepare for his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, to take over power after 2013. Analyses of Kazakhstan's foreign policy therefore both has had and will continue to have a close focus on the person of Nursultan Nazarbayev. In addit…
Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy
Russia’s new strategic partnership with the West has both international and domestic causes. In terms of domestic causes, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and James Lee Ray propose that domestic interest groups are likely to have a particular impact on foreign policy in semi-democratic states such as Russia. This is because the political leadership is more dependent on satisfying these group interests than on providing for public/national interests in ord…
Book Notes
Book Notes
Book Notes
Book Notes
Ukraine and Nato
Off the Cuff Politics—Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy
THERE IS A BLATANT PARADOX in Russia's policy towards Ukraine. On the one hand, there are few discussions that bring out more consensus across the Russian political spectrum than discussions of Russian-Ukrainian relations. On the other hand, Russia was not at any time during the first 10 years of Ukrainian independence able to produce a co-ordinated political strategy for the conduct of relations with her southern neighbour. The recent appointmen…
Arming the Ayatollahs: Economic Lobbies in Russia’s Iran Policy
Powerful special interest groups influence Russian policy on the sale of arms to Iran
Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy
Russia’s new strategic partnership with the West has both international and domestic causes. In terms of domestic causes, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and James Lee Ray propose that domestic interest groups are likely to have a particular impact on foreign policy in semi-democratic states such as Russia. This is because the political leadership is more dependent on satisfying these group interests than on providing for public/national interests in ord…
Private Interests, Public Policy: Ukraine and the Common Economic Space Agreement
Ukrainian foreign policy maintains a delicate balance between private, factional, and national interests
Astana's Privatised Independence: Private and National Interests in the Foreign Policy of Nursultan Nazarbayev
Nursultan Nazarbayev has been President of Kazakhstan since that country became independent in 1991. Observers expect him to remain in his current position until 2013, and there are clear indications that he has started to prepare for his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, to take over power after 2013. Analyses of Kazakhstan's foreign policy therefore both has had and will continue to have a close focus on the person of Nursultan Nazarbayev. In addit…
Their Hands in the Till: Scale and Causes of Russian Military Corruption
The change from Yeltsin to Putin has had minimal effect on Russian military corruption. Putin, despite his desire to rebuild Russian strength, has not shown himself willing or able to seriously deal with this problem. The fluctuations in the level of military corruption in the post-Soviet period seem largely to be explained by changes in availability of things to steal or embezzle. Thus, the latter years' substantial increases in defense spending…
Iron Cannot Fight 1 – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory
Contemporary Russian military theory is dominated by three schools of thought: the ‘traditionalists’, the ‘modernists’ and the ‘revolutionaries’. On the role of technology in future warfare, the traditionalists argue for both high tech and massive forces at the same time. The modernists are ready to trade manpower for technology, whereas the revolutionaries give technology full priority. Both the traditionalists and the modernists believe Russia,…
Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government – the Case of Russian Special Operations Forces
Russian Special Forces saw significant changes to both organization and doctrine in the years after 2008. The special forces of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate were reduced in number, the organization’s institutional autonomy and rationale were changed, and an entirely new Special Operations Command was established in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the nature, scope and purpose of these changes, and to explain them by …
Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas
Special operations forces have played an important role in Russian warfare against Ukraine. In Crimea, they engaged in mostly covert action tasks, whereas in Donbas they engaged in more regular special operations functions such as special reconnaissance, military assistance, and direct action. The annexation of Crimea was the first time in which the new Special Operations Command took on a leading role. Based on the Ukrainian experience, there is…
Why Putin went to war: Ideology, interests and decision-making in the Russian use of force in Crimea and Donbas
Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the country's prominent role in instigating and supporting an anti-Kiev rebellion in Donbas, surprised the world. This study seeks to explain Russian behaviour in these two cases. Because of the recent nature of events, there is so far not an abundance of reliable sources. Thus, some of the findings in this study should be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive. It is argued that dominating Russian axiom…
The threat of war and domestic restraints to defence reform- how fear of major military conflict changed and did not change the Ukrainian military 2014-2019
The annexation of Crimea and the Russia enabled rebellion in Donbas created a need for radical improvements of Ukrainian military capability. This study discusses how different, mostly domestic, reform drivers and reform impeding factors had impact on the pace of Ukrainian top-down defence reform in the period since the confrontation with Russia started in 2014. It concludes that reform has been uneven, and that while vested organizational intere…
Fighting on behalf of the state—the issue of pro-government militia autonomy in the Donbas war
This study investigates the degree of autonomy the Ukrainian volunteer battalions had from the regular forces during the war in Donbas. The findings indicate that the degree of autonomy was high and that in particular, three initial conditions were decisive for this outcome: (1) the relative level of militia military strength in the initial states of conflict; (2) the degree of agenda overlap; (3) the degree of bottom-up organization. The empiric…
Private military companies - Russian great power politics on the cheap
In a situation where the Russian national self-image and economic realities fail to add up, this article discusses whether Russian private military companies have become low-cost tools to restore Russian great power status. Our findings suggest that whenever these companies are used in a ‘power as outcome’ way, they appear less successful at adding great power status on the cheap and less useful at elite enrichment. In contrast, PMCs seem well su…
War and the Willingness to Resist and Fight in Ukraine
This study explores the effects of Russia's use of military force on the Ukrainian willingness to fight and resist. We find assumptions from the theoretical literature on the willingness to fight of limited relevance. Instead, our analysis suggests that Ukrainian willingness to fight and resist correlates with (1) a growth in Ukrainian civic nationalism; (2) an increase in trust in Ukrainian political institutions, particularly the Ukrainian arme…
Failures in Ukrainian Arms Procurement 2014–2023
This article discusses critical failures in Ukrainian defense production and procurement in the period 2014 to 2023. The main puzzle is why Ukraine did so little to satisfy the needs of the country’s armed forces in essential segments of military capabilities when there seems to have been no disagreement on their necessity. Furthermore, both technological and financial resources appear to have been present. The main argument is that Ukraine’s sta…
Political science (16 works) · Law (12 works) · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies (11 works) · Political economy (11 works) · Economics (9 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (9 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies (6 works)