Off the Cuff Politics—Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12299352 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tor Bukkvoll (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 1141-1157 |
| Publication date | 2001-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Europe Asia Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8136 • E-ISSN: 1465-3427 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09668130120093165 |
| OpenAlex | W2008192651 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 2 |
THERE IS A BLATANT PARADOX in Russia's policy towards Ukraine. On the one hand, there are few discussions that bring out more consensus across the Russian political spectrum than discussions of Russian-Ukrainian relations. On the other hand, Russia was not at any time during the first 10 years of Ukrainian independence able to produce a co-ordinated political strategy for the conduct of relations with her southern neighbour. The recent appointment as ambassador to Ukraine of the political heavyweight and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin could be the first indication of a more coherent Russian Ukraine strategy based on a principle of economy first, but that is still too early to say. How can the 10-year lack of a political strategy be explained? In this article I will try to explain why Russia has not been able to bring into being any coherent strategy in its policy towards Ukraine. This is especially surprising since policy towards Ukraine, more than most other foreign policy issues, was centralised and taken care of by the president and his administration. I will seek my explanations for this lack of strategy on three levels: the cognitive level, the level of resources for influence, and the bureaucratic level. I will structure the article around three working hypotheses on why Russia has not been able to generate a consistent Ukraine policy. First, the Russian political establishment has not truly come to terms with the existence of an independent Ukraine. Second, except for oil and gas, Russia has realised that her resources for influencing Ukraine are limited. Third, peculiarities of the Russian system of foreign policy making-particularly in the Ukrainian case-made a coherent foreign policy difficult to achieve. The focus for this study is not what Russia has and has not achieved in her relations with Ukraine, but why policy towards the southern neighbour has been so haphazard. That is, I focus on output rather than outcome
Economic system · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · European Politics and Security · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics
Between Dependence and Integration
Clashing Agendas? Economic Interests, Elite Coalitions and Prospects for Co-operation between Russia and Ukraine
The European Union’s ‘Ideal Self’ in the Post-Soviet Space
Alliance-building between great power commitment and misperceptions
The power of civilizational nationalism in Russian foreign policy making
Introduction
Russian Policy Concerning the Black Sea Fleet and its Being Based in Ukraine, 2008–2010
National Identities and Virtual Foreign Policies among the Eastern Slavs
National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine
Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine policy, 1991-present
Russian strategic culture
Why Putin went to war
The Ukrainian conflict in Russian foreign policy
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,57 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2022 (20) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |