Bernhard Reinsberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 267258 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bernhard Reinsberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bernhard |
| FAMILY NAME | Reinsberg |
| SIGNATURE | REINSBERG B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7382-413X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 62 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 262 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 62 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
The Price of Responsiveness: Examining the Impact of Competition and Earmarked Funding on Humanitarian Aid Effectiveness
The humanitarian sector is a crowded policy space where humanitarian international organizations (HIOs) compete for limited resources. While existing research examines why HIOs compete or how competition affects their survival, the impact on organizational performance remains underexplored. This article assesses how competition for resources, within a system dominated by earmarked funding, affects the ability of HIOs to deliver humanitarian respo…
Siloes of influence: The political economy of resourcing international organizations
International organizations (IOs) are essential for solving global problems, but the resources that undergird their vitality—money, staff, and support—have come under intense strain. This special issue advances the research program on IO resourcing by addressing three critical gaps. First, contributors provide new fine-grained data to track how states leverage heterogenous resource types to enhance institutional control, moving beyond resource ag…
Fact or fear? Elite and public opinion on the misuse of foreign aid
This article investigates how information on the misuse of foreign aid affects support for aid among citizens and politicians. It draws on original survey data and experiments with a representative sample of 2,205 UK citizens and 117 UK parliamentarians. The findings show a significant public backlash against foreign aid when misuse is revealed. This backlash is not confined to the country where the scandal occurred but spills over to other aid r…
IMF Conditionality on Corruption: The Politics of Good Governance
We offer a systematic analysis of IMF loan conditionality on corruption and argue that the Fund's pursuit of anti‐corruption measures is tempered by two political costs. First, because corruption is politically sensitive, the IMF risks destabilizing recipient governments and provoking crises. Second, these domestic risks translate into institutional costs: imposing such measures in strategically important countries (e.g., US allies or temporary U…
How does inter-institutional competition affect the performance of multilateral development finance institutions
How does inter-institutional competition emerging from the creation of new multilateral development banks (MDBs) affect the performance of existing institutions? Since newly established MDBs can deprive incumbents of vital resources, existing banks have strong incentives to respond. Using a large dataset of 30 MDBs across 144 countries from 1946 to 2013, we first demonstrate that existing MDBs respond to the establishment of a new competitor by i…
Unlocking Public Support: How Communication about Program Design Affects Public Perception of IMF Interventions
Does communication about International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs influence citizen support for reforms and the institution itself? Using a survey experiment in Pakistan, we investigate whether emphasizing specific program content—tax increases, budget cuts, or social welfare packages—shifts public opinion. We find that while highlighting adjustment costs like tax hikes and spending cuts reduces program support, emphasizing the continuity of so…
Field Presence and the Performance of Environmental Projects: Evidence from the Global Environment Facility
Scant attention has been paid to how field presence shapes the implementation of environment-earmarked projects by international organizations (IOs), such as those funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). GEF funding is based on a process whereby implementing IOs and recipient partners co-design projects based on GEF criteria. Once approved by GEF, projects are implemented with no direct GEF involvement, but are later evaluated by a dedic…
The Scapegoating Hypothesis Revisited: Unpacking Blame Attribution toward the International Monetary Fund
Governments in economic hardship that borrow from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under strict conditionalities are commonly expected to scapegoat the Fund to prevent domestic protest and electoral punishment. But we know little about the micro-level mechanisms underpinnings this scapegoating hypothesis. This paper theoretically specifies and empirically assesses two strategies that governments can employ to shape whom citizens hold respons…
The role of IMF programs in aligning national economic policy with domestic preferences
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) promotes reforms emphasizing individual economic freedom and market competition. However, IMF loan conditions face criticism for potentially undermining democracy by encouraging policy shifts that may not reflect citizens’ preferences. We examine how IMF lending impacts economic congruence—the alignment between government policies and public preferences for economic freedom and market competition. Lack of con…
Doing Things Right Versus Doing the Right Things? Ownership's Effect on the Sustainable Development Goals
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the focal point for coordinating global efforts toward promoting sustainable development. However, progress toward the SDGs has stalled. This article shifts attention to the behaviors of development partners as a key determinant of SDG attainment. It argues that lukewarm donor commitment to recipient‐country ownership has prevented greater SDG attainment. While ownership is a procedural goal in its own…
Pathologies in the United Nations Development System: The Role of Funding Structures
The United Nations Development System plays a key role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, but it faces criticisms such as duplication of efforts, lack of coordination, and poor fit. Drawing on research in the tradition of organizational pathologies, we interrogate how inadequate funding structures underlie such problems. We develop a framework that connects features of earmarked funding to development effectiveness through their effe…
Understanding Resourcing Trade-offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment
International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the most important global challenges under intense budget scarcity. In recent years, they expanded their funding base through a greater reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions by member states and non-state actors. Critics warn that earmarked funding creates an important trade-off: IOs can do more with earmarked funding, but have less control over what they do and do it less …
The French duty of vigilance law: Reconciling Human Rights and Firm Profitability
Concerns have arisen that due diligence laws, which hold companies accountable for human rights abuses and environmental damage in their supply chains, will negatively impact firm performance. Critics have argued that compliance costs, increased scrutiny, and potential disruptions to supply chains will erode profitability. This study investigates these concerns by examining the impact of the 2017 French ‘loi de vigilance’ on the performance of 11…
Institutional overlap and the survival of intergovernmental organisations
A burgeoning literature emphasises the role of favourable external conditions and institutional design as key drivers of the survival of intergovernmental organisations. This article focuses on institutional overlap as a hitherto overlooked determinant of IGO survival. Studies on institutional complexity posit that overlap – the extent to which organisations perform similar tasks to address similar problems for some common members – may decrease …
Core funding and the performance of international organizations: Evidence from UNDP projects
Scholarship on the administration of international organizations (IOs) has extensively discussed how autonomy influences their performance. While some argue that autonomy increases performance through greater adaptability, others warn that it may increase the risk of agency slack. Authors typically distinguish between three types of performance: output, outcome, and impact performance. We focus on core funding as a key source of IO autonomy and a…
Empowering women in central banking
When are women appointed to the board of central banks? While progressive societal gender norms may facilitate women's ascension to leadership positions, recent research indicates that women are more likely to assume leadership positions during crisis periods. Because of the widely documented 'male dominance' in the policy domain of central banking, analyzing changes in women's descriptive representation on central bank boards provides a unique l…
China Lending and the Political Economy of Leader Survival
What are the political implications of Chinese loans to borrowing countries? Our argument is that similar to other forms of international finance, loans from China provide leaders with additional resources to maintain their power. The nature of China’s lending practices—characterized by an absence of good governance conditions—offers a unique advantage to political leaders, allowing corrupt leaders who receive loans from China to stay in power fo…
Public Support for Green, Inclusive, and Resilient Growth Conditionality in International Monetary Fund Bailouts
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently expanded its policy scope to include a broader set of policies to promote green, inclusive, and resilient growth. How does this expansion affect the support for the IMF and its loans among the populations of borrowing countries? We conducted a pre-registered survey experiment with 2,694 respondents from three borrower countries—Argentina, Kenya, and Pakistan. We show that support for IMF programs…
Transparency and citizen support for public agencies: The case of foreign aid
Can public agencies boost support for their mandate by being more transparent? We examine this important question in the context of foreign aid. Skepticism about foreign aid spending is common among citizens. This article argues that bilateral aid agencies can increase support for foreign aid by enhancing transparency. The article presents findings from three survey experiments involving a representative sample of 2058 British citizens, as well a…
Informal state influence in international organizations: Examining the Link Between Executive Head Nationality and Earmarked Funding
This article examines whether and how donor states engage differentially with earmarked funding within the multilateral system when their nationals hold executive office in international organizations (IOs). The article relies on recent scholarship on multilateral finance and IO bureaucracies to identify executive representation and earmarked funding as tools that states may use for exerting influence within IOs. Based on that, the article expect…
How Does Earmarked Foreign Aid Affect Recipient‐Country Ownership
How does earmarked foreign aid affect country ownership, a central principle of the aid effectiveness agenda? Although earmarking was initially purported to reduce donor fragmentation and enhance aid effectiveness, recent evidence suggests that it may undermine ownership. Despite formal commitments to ownership by multilateral institutions and bilateral donors within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), earmarking potentially strengthens t…
Issue congruence in international organizations: A study of World Bank spending
International organizations (IOs) are often criticized for insulated decision‐making processes that do not react to the preferences of key stakeholders that are directly affected by them. However, empirical studies probing the degree to which IOs’ policies are aligned with the preferences of such key constituencies are scarce. This paper tackles the gap by studying the case of the World Bank. We argue that congruence with stakeholder preferences …
Does earmarked funding affect the performance of international organisations
What determines the performance of international organisations (IOs)? We argue that funding structures remain an overlooked driver of IO performance. Over the past decades, donor governments have provided an increasing share of their contributions to IOs in the form of earmarked resources, which provide them with the opportunity to restrict the use of funding to specific themes, sectors, regions, countries or projects. This development has raised…
Trust funds and the sub-national effectiveness of development aid: Evidence from the World Bank
Existing studies imply that multilateral development assistance is more effective than bilateral assistance. However, multilateral assistance is increasingly constrained through earmarked funding where donors restrict the use of their funds. Such funding shifts decision-making power away from multilateral donors and increases transaction costs through more stringent monitoring requirements. We argue that the consequences of these constraints are …
Aid effectiveness and donor motives
A vast literature evaluates the effectiveness of development aid, often reaching sobering conclusions. We argue that a key shortcoming of this literature is the focus on a narrow concept of effectiveness—mostly economic growth—that does not match the kind of effectiveness that aid donors actually aim at. To determine actual donor motives, we first survey the literature on aid allocation and identify a large set of motives that is common to many d…
Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization
The World System and the Hollowing Out of State Capacity: How Structural Adjustment Programs Affect Bureaucratic Quality in Developing Countries
The administrative ability of the state to deliver effective policy is essential for economic development. While sociologists have long devoted attention to domestic forces underpinning state capacity, the authors focus on world system pressures from Western-dominated international organizations. Scrutinizing policy reforms mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the authors argue that “structural conditions” exert deleterious effects …
Aid effectiveness and donor motives
A vast literature evaluates the effectiveness of development aid, often reaching sobering conclusions. We argue that a key shortcoming of this literature is the focus on a narrow concept of effectiveness—mostly economic growth—that does not match the kind of effectiveness that aid donors actually aim at. To determine actual donor motives, we first survey the literature on aid allocation and identify a large set of motives that is common to many d…
The political economy of labor market deregulation during IMF interventions
This study examines the relationship between policy interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and de jure labor rights. Combining two novel data sets with unprecedented country-year coverage – leximetric data on labor laws and disaggregated data on IMF conditionality – our analysis of up to 70 developing countries from 1980 to 2014 demonstrates that IMF-mandated labor market policy measures significantly reduce both individual and co…
How structural adjustment programs affect inequality: A disaggregated analysis of IMF conditionality, 1980-2014
Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations
Since the 1990s, the funding of multilateral development assistance has rapidly transformed. Donors increasingly constrain the discretion of international development organizations (IDOs) through earmarked funding, which limits the purposes for which a donor's funds can be used. The consequences of this development for IDOs’ operational performance are insufficiently understood. We hypothesize that increases in administrative burdens due to earma…
The Political Economy of Chinese Debt and International Monetary Fund Conditionality
Developing and emerging market economies have increased their debt exposure to China in recent years. Despite its initial promise, many borrowers of Chinese loans face difficulties in meeting these loan obligations. Under what circumstances do Chinese borrowers in debt distress turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? Our starting point is that Chinese loans are tied into projects that promise to generate sufficient revenue to repay these l…
Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is infamous for its structural adjustment programs, requiring countries to undertake policy reforms in exchange for loans. Yet, not only do countries routinely fail to implement these reforms, but they also frequently return to the IMF to start the process anew. What explains this compelling case of transnational regulatory ineffectiveness? We argue that countries are caught in a dependency trap: politically …
Which Donors, Which Funds? Bilateral Donors' Choice of Multilateral Funds at the World Bank
The rapid growth of trust funds at multilateral development organizations has been widely neglected in the academic literature. We examine sovereign donors' choices among various trust fund options and contend that the choice among the different trust funds involves a fundamental trade-off: larger funds provide donors with “burden-sharing” benefits, but each donor can better assert its individual preferences in a fund with fewer other donors. The…
Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world
International organizations have become key actors in the fight against corruption. Among these organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains a powerful position over borrowing countries in its ability to mandate far‐ranging policy reforms – so‐called “conditionalities” – in exchange for access to financial assistance. While IMF pressure can force the implementation of anti‐corruption policies, potentially reducing corruption, ot…
The Politics of Double Delegation in the European Union
Many international organizations channel financial contributions of their member countries through other international organizations to implement their programs and activities. In this context, the second step of the delegation chain is often costly and—at least seemingly—an easily avoidable duplication of a previous one. We examine the puzzling phenomenon of double delegation in the context of European aid. We argue that governments engage in do…
Earmarked Funding and the Performance of International Organizations: Evidence from Food and Agricultural Development Agencies
How do funding structures affect the performance of international organizations (IOs)? Considering the rapid growth of earmarked funding over the past decade, the need to address this question has become a matter of urgency. To answer this question, I divide IO performance into outcome performance (i.e., achieving results that are relevant and sustainable) and process performance (i.e., having systems, rules, and practices that enable IOs to achi…
Structural adjustment, alienation, and mass protest
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is (in)famous for its structural adjustment programs, which provide fresh credit for borrowing governments in exchange for market-liberalizing policy reforms. While studies have documented a causal relationship between structural adjustment and political instability, scholarly understanding of the mechanisms underlying this relationship remain perfunctory. The received wisdom is that IMF policy conditions gen…
Partisanship, protection, and punishment: How governments affect the distributional consequences of International Monetary Fund programs
How do governments allocate the burden of adjustment of reform programs sponsored by international financial institutions? While the political economy literature is ripe with theoretical arguments about this issue, we have a limited empirical understanding of the distributional effects of these programs, except for a few informative case studies. We argue that governments allocate adjustment burdens strategically to protect their own partisan sup…
Unimplementable by design? Understanding (non‐)compliance with International Monetary Fund policy conditionality
Why do governments fail to implement policy commitments in contractual agreements with international organizations? While scholars have scrutinized domestic factors as obstacles to compliance, we argue that reform programs may beunimplementable by design. We study this hypothesis in the context of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, in which borrowing countries must commit to far‐reaching economic policy reforms for access to credit. We c…
Women's leadership and the gendered consequences of austerity in the public sector: Evidence from IMF programs
During times of economic turmoil, women often bear the cost of cuts in public spending and labor market deregulation. We argue that the adverse gendered consequences of austerity are mitigated when women occupy more political leadership positions. We test our argument using two independent sources of evidence. First, we use cross‐country time‐series data for 95 countries from 2000 to 2018 on public‐sector employment outcomes and panel regressions…
Creating crony capitalism: Neoliberal Globalization and the Fueling of Corruption
This article examines how neoliberal policies mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) impact on corruption in developing countries. Combining domestic political analysis with world systems and dependency theories, we hypothesize that these reforms concentrate losses on influential social groups such as businesses and civil servants, who then engage in corrupt practices to maintain their privileged positions. Using an original dataset of…
Do Countries Use Foreign Aid to Buy Geopolitical Influence? Evidence from Donor Campaigns for Temporary UN Security Council Seats
In recent years, donor countries have increasingly used different aid allocation channels to boost aid effectiveness. One delivery channel that has grown tremendously is ‘multi-bi aid’—contributions to multilateral organizations earmarked for specific development purposes. This article examines whether donors use multi-bi aid to further their selfish goals—specifically, to garner political support for their ambition to become a temporary member o…
Small Donors in World Politics: The Role of Trust Funds in the Foreign Aid Policies of Central and Eastern European Donors
Donor bureaucratic organisation and the pursuit of performance-based aid through multilateral trust funds
The domestic sources of sub-state foreign policymaking: Determinants of subnational development cooperation across European regions
Subnational governments have come to challenge the foreign policymaking monopoly of national governments. An increasingly salient area of sub-state foreign policymaking is international development cooperation, but systematic knowledge about the drivers of such activities is limited. We argue that subnational governments develop capacities for international development cooperation for domestic region-building purposes, geared toward advancing pol…
Fully-automated liberalism? Blockchain technology and international cooperation in an anarchic world
A recent wave of scholarship attests that the liberal world order is under threat. Although there is disagreement about the underlying reasons for this diagnosis, there are few attempts to further our understanding of how the liberal order can be reinvigorated. This paper probes the potential of blockchain technology to promote international cooperation. Blockchain technology is a data structure that enables global governance stakeholders to esta…
Institutional overlap and the survival of intergovernmental organisations
A burgeoning literature emphasises the role of favourable external conditions and institutional design as key drivers of the survival of intergovernmental organisations. This article focuses on institutional overlap as a hitherto overlooked determinant of IGO survival. Studies on institutional complexity posit that overlap – the extent to which organisations perform similar tasks to address similar problems for some common members – may decrease …
Transparency and citizen support for public agencies: The case of foreign aid
Can public agencies boost support for their mandate by being more transparent? We examine this important question in the context of foreign aid. Skepticism about foreign aid spending is common among citizens. This article argues that bilateral aid agencies can increase support for foreign aid by enhancing transparency. The article presents findings from three survey experiments involving a representative sample of 2058 British citizens, as well a…
Trust funds and the sub-national effectiveness of development aid: Evidence from the World Bank
Existing studies imply that multilateral development assistance is more effective than bilateral assistance. However, multilateral assistance is increasingly constrained through earmarked funding where donors restrict the use of their funds. Such funding shifts decision-making power away from multilateral donors and increases transaction costs through more stringent monitoring requirements. We argue that the consequences of these constraints are …
Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization
Which Donors, Which Funds? Bilateral Donors' Choice of Multilateral Funds at the World Bank
The rapid growth of trust funds at multilateral development organizations has been widely neglected in the academic literature. We examine sovereign donors' choices among various trust fund options and contend that the choice among the different trust funds involves a fundamental trade-off: larger funds provide donors with “burden-sharing” benefits, but each donor can better assert its individual preferences in a fund with fewer other donors. The…
Small Donors in World Politics: The Role of Trust Funds in the Foreign Aid Policies of Central and Eastern European Donors
The Politics of Double Delegation in the European Union
Many international organizations channel financial contributions of their member countries through other international organizations to implement their programs and activities. In this context, the second step of the delegation chain is often costly and—at least seemingly—an easily avoidable duplication of a previous one. We examine the puzzling phenomenon of double delegation in the context of European aid. We argue that governments engage in do…
Do Countries Use Foreign Aid to Buy Geopolitical Influence? Evidence from Donor Campaigns for Temporary UN Security Council Seats
In recent years, donor countries have increasingly used different aid allocation channels to boost aid effectiveness. One delivery channel that has grown tremendously is ‘multi-bi aid’—contributions to multilateral organizations earmarked for specific development purposes. This article examines whether donors use multi-bi aid to further their selfish goals—specifically, to garner political support for their ambition to become a temporary member o…
The International Monetary Fund’s interventions in food and agriculture: An analysis of loans and conditions
The political economy of labor market deregulation during IMF interventions
This study examines the relationship between policy interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and de jure labor rights. Combining two novel data sets with unprecedented country-year coverage – leximetric data on labor laws and disaggregated data on IMF conditionality – our analysis of up to 70 developing countries from 1980 to 2014 demonstrates that IMF-mandated labor market policy measures significantly reduce both individual and co…
The World System and the Hollowing Out of State Capacity: How Structural Adjustment Programs Affect Bureaucratic Quality in Developing Countries
The administrative ability of the state to deliver effective policy is essential for economic development. While sociologists have long devoted attention to domestic forces underpinning state capacity, the authors focus on world system pressures from Western-dominated international organizations. Scrutinizing policy reforms mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the authors argue that “structural conditions” exert deleterious effects …
How structural adjustment programs affect inequality: A disaggregated analysis of IMF conditionality, 1980-2014
Interrogating Technology‐led Experiments in Sustainability Governance
Solutions to global sustainability challenges are increasingly technology‐intensive. Yet, technologies are neither developed nor applied to governance problems in a socio‐political vacuum. Despite aspirations to provide novel solutions to current sustainability governance challenges, many technology‐centred projects, pilots and plans remain implicated in longer‐standing global governance trends shaping the possibilities for success in often under…
Fully-automated liberalism? Blockchain technology and international cooperation in an anarchic world
A recent wave of scholarship attests that the liberal world order is under threat. Although there is disagreement about the underlying reasons for this diagnosis, there are few attempts to further our understanding of how the liberal order can be reinvigorated. This paper probes the potential of blockchain technology to promote international cooperation. Blockchain technology is a data structure that enables global governance stakeholders to esta…
Taxing the People, Not Trade: The International Monetary Fund and the Structure of Taxation in Developing Countries
Strengthening fiscal capacity in low- and middle-income countries is essential for achieving sustainable development. The International Monetary Fund—the world’s premier agent of fiscal policy reform—has taken a front-stage role in this process, promoting a model of tax policy that favors broad-based consumption taxes and discourages trade taxes. This article investigates the links between IMF-mandated tax reforms and the evolution of tax revenue…
Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world
International organizations have become key actors in the fight against corruption. Among these organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains a powerful position over borrowing countries in its ability to mandate far‐ranging policy reforms – so‐called “conditionalities” – in exchange for access to financial assistance. While IMF pressure can force the implementation of anti‐corruption policies, potentially reducing corruption, ot…
The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence
Creating crony capitalism: Neoliberal Globalization and the Fueling of Corruption
This article examines how neoliberal policies mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) impact on corruption in developing countries. Combining domestic political analysis with world systems and dependency theories, we hypothesize that these reforms concentrate losses on influential social groups such as businesses and civil servants, who then engage in corrupt practices to maintain their privileged positions. Using an original dataset of…
Development co‐operation by European regions: Introducing the subnational donor governance dataset
Donor bureaucratic organisation and the pursuit of performance-based aid through multilateral trust funds
The domestic sources of sub-state foreign policymaking: Determinants of subnational development cooperation across European regions
Subnational governments have come to challenge the foreign policymaking monopoly of national governments. An increasingly salient area of sub-state foreign policymaking is international development cooperation, but systematic knowledge about the drivers of such activities is limited. We argue that subnational governments develop capacities for international development cooperation for domestic region-building purposes, geared toward advancing pol…
Partisanship, protection, and punishment: How governments affect the distributional consequences of International Monetary Fund programs
How do governments allocate the burden of adjustment of reform programs sponsored by international financial institutions? While the political economy literature is ripe with theoretical arguments about this issue, we have a limited empirical understanding of the distributional effects of these programs, except for a few informative case studies. We argue that governments allocate adjustment burdens strategically to protect their own partisan sup…
Revisiting the security–development nexus: Human security and the effects of IMF adjustment programmes
The concept of ‘human security’ holds promise of capturing the strong connections between economic development and personal security that has ushered in the debate about the ‘security−development nexus’ in policy circles. Human security is understood as the ability of states to protect the security of their citizens and to cater to their basic socioeconomic needs. However, the literature on human security is fragmented, leaving applied researcher…
Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is infamous for its structural adjustment programs, requiring countries to undertake policy reforms in exchange for loans. Yet, not only do countries routinely fail to implement these reforms, but they also frequently return to the IMF to start the process anew. What explains this compelling case of transnational regulatory ineffectiveness? We argue that countries are caught in a dependency trap: politically …
Unimplementable by design? Understanding (non‐)compliance with International Monetary Fund policy conditionality
Why do governments fail to implement policy commitments in contractual agreements with international organizations? While scholars have scrutinized domestic factors as obstacles to compliance, we argue that reform programs may beunimplementable by design. We study this hypothesis in the context of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, in which borrowing countries must commit to far‐reaching economic policy reforms for access to credit. We c…
The Political Economy of Chinese Debt and International Monetary Fund Conditionality
Developing and emerging market economies have increased their debt exposure to China in recent years. Despite its initial promise, many borrowers of Chinese loans face difficulties in meeting these loan obligations. Under what circumstances do Chinese borrowers in debt distress turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? Our starting point is that Chinese loans are tied into projects that promise to generate sufficient revenue to repay these l…
How transparent are aid agencies to their citizens? Introducing the Citizen Aid Transparency Dataset
Existing measures of aid transparency overwhelmingly focus on how much information donor agencies are willing to share with the international donor community, overlooking that transparency is about increasing citizens' access to information in order to improve government accountability. In this article, we present the Citizen Aid Transparency Dataset (CATD). Using factor and correlation analysis, we show that the CATD captures a different dimensi…
Crash for cash: Offshore financial destinations and IMF programs
A growing body of literature scrutinizes the harmful consequences of capital flight to offshore financial destinations. While financial integration is a well-known facilitator of capital flight, we shed light on an under-appreciated determinant—the availability of an IMF bailout. Expanding on previous literature analyzing moral hazard in the context of IMF programs, we introduce a socially even more destructive mechanism that we label the ‘crash …
International Development and Aid (54 works) · Economics (41 works) · Political science (40 works) · Business (31 works) · Politics (31 works) · Finance (19 works) · Economic growth (16 works) · Law (16 works) · Conditionality (14 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (11 works)