China Lending and the Political Economy of Leader Survival

Bibliographic Data

ID6284498
AuthorsPatrick E Shea (0000-0002-5051-4443, University of Glasgow, corresponding author), Bernhard Reinsberg (0000-0001-7382-413X, University of Glasgow), Anton Kern (0000-0003-1450-0404, Georgetown University), Andreas Kern (Georgetown University)
Year2025
Volume69
Issue4
Pages571-598
Publication date2025-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027241263036
OpenAlexW4399846692
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited66

What are the political implications of Chinese loans to borrowing countries? Our argument is that similar to other forms of international finance, loans from China provide leaders with additional resources to maintain their power. The nature of China’s lending practices—characterized by an absence of good governance conditions—offers a unique advantage to political leaders, allowing corrupt leaders who receive loans from China to stay in power for longer periods. To support this argument, we conducted an analysis of a dataset of 115 developing countries from 2000 to 2015, focusing on the relationship between Chinese loans and leaders' political survival. Our findings indicate that Chinese loans positively impact leader survival, with the strongest effects observed in more corrupt regimes. To address endogeneity concerns, we employ a shift-share instrumentation strategy and several additional tests. Our analysis underscores the importance of Chinese lending to both international and domestic politics

China · Economics · Political science · Politics · International Development and Aid

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