IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’état
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285573 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brett A Casper (New York University), Brett Casper (New York University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 964-996 |
| Publication date | 2017-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002715600759 |
| OpenAlex | W1776284215 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 43 |
Leaders use the distribution of economic rents to maintain the political support of regime elites. When countries join International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, they are often required to implement a variety of free market-inspired reforms—such as privatization, reductions in government spending, and the restructuring of financial institutions—as a condition for receiving program funds. These types of reforms can diminish a leader’s capacity to redistribute wealth, which ultimately increases the risk of a coup. More specifically, when a leader begins the implementation of an IMF arrangement, the leader’s action provides public information about the leader’s weakened ability to redistribute wealth in the future. Thus, the act of implementing an IMF program provides each individual elite with information about his or her expected value of rents in the future, and this information gives elites who stand to be harmed by a reform an incentive to launch a coup
Business · Economic policy · Economic rent · Economics · Elite · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Restructuring · Value (mathematics · Variety (cybernetics · Finance · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · International Development and Aid · Political Conflict and Governance
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| Unique citing works | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 20 |