Brett Casper
Biographic Data
| ID | 4437396 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brett Casper |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brett |
| FAMILY NAME | Casper |
| SIGNATURE | CASPER B |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 158 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’état
Leaders use the distribution of economic rents to maintain the political support of regime elites. When countries join International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, they are often required to implement a variety of free market-inspired reforms—such as privatization, reductions in government spending, and the restructuring of financial institutions—as a condition for receiving program funds. These types of reforms can diminish a leader’s capacity to…
Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
Elites face a daunting coordination problem when contemplating a coup. Citizens, who desire political reform, face a similar coordination problem when contemplating protest. Since elites and citizens interact with the same leadership, these coordination problems are invariably linked. We develop a model which exploits this link to isolate an informational mechanism connecting popular protests and coups. Protests aggregate citizen information and …
Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
Elites face a daunting coordination problem when contemplating a coup. Citizens, who desire political reform, face a similar coordination problem when contemplating protest. Since elites and citizens interact with the same leadership, these coordination problems are invariably linked. We develop a model which exploits this link to isolate an informational mechanism connecting popular protests and coups. Protests aggregate citizen information and …
IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’état
Leaders use the distribution of economic rents to maintain the political support of regime elites. When countries join International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, they are often required to implement a variety of free market-inspired reforms—such as privatization, reductions in government spending, and the restructuring of financial institutions—as a condition for receiving program funds. These types of reforms can diminish a leader’s capacity to…
Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
Elites face a daunting coordination problem when contemplating a coup. Citizens, who desire political reform, face a similar coordination problem when contemplating protest. Since elites and citizens interact with the same leadership, these coordination problems are invariably linked. We develop a model which exploits this link to isolate an informational mechanism connecting popular protests and coups. Protests aggregate citizen information and …
IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’état
Leaders use the distribution of economic rents to maintain the political support of regime elites. When countries join International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, they are often required to implement a variety of free market-inspired reforms—such as privatization, reductions in government spending, and the restructuring of financial institutions—as a condition for receiving program funds. These types of reforms can diminish a leader’s capacity to…
Elite (2 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Business (1 works) · Economic policy (1 works) · Economic rent (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 works) · Face (sociological concept (1 works)