Politics and IMF Conditionality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285020 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Axel Dreher (0000-0002-4017-8570, Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany), Jan-Egbert Sturm (0000-0002-9421-5736, CESifo, Munich, Germany), James Raymond Vreeland (0000-0002-3429-8517, Georgetown University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 120-148 |
| Publication date | 2015-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002713499723 |
| OpenAlex | W2120551854 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 65 |
| References cited | 54 |
Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather weak stringency. Obstacles to testing this hypothesis include finding a measure of political importance that is not plagued by endogeneity and obtaining data on IMF conditionality. We propose to measure political importance using temporary membership on the UN Security Council and analyze a newly available data set on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the 1992–2008 period. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions. This suggests that the major shareholders of the IMF trade softer conditionality in return for political influence over the Security Council
Conditionality · Economic policy · Economics · Endogeneity · International economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic Growth and Development · International Development and Aid · Law
Aggrieved Labor Strikes Back
Safety First
Climate policy at the International Monetary Fund
Examining New Donors in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee
Development Policy Space and Internationalization of China’s Contender State
The West’s Teeth
The effects of IMF conditional programs on the unemployment rate
The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence
Coalition building in the UN Security Council
IMF Conditionality on Corruption
Crash for cash
Political budget cycle – does participation in IMF programs matter
The IMF and government health expenditure
Business as usual? How the pharmaceutical industry protected its long-term interests during and after eurozone bailouts (2011–2020)
Selective Friendship at the Fund”
It’s a Hard-Knock Life
Signaling to creditors and voters
The effects of IMF loan conditions on poverty in the developing world
Do geopolitical interests affect how financial markets react to IMF programs
IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014
China’s status deficit and the debut of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Elected member influence in the United Nations Security Council
Do economic institutions count in giving aid? Comparative observations on aid allocation between the U.S. and other Development Assistance Committee members
Catalyzing Aid? The IMF and Donor Behavior in Aid Allocation
Aid effectiveness and donor motives
Sanctions, aid, and voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly
Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality, Partisanship, and Labor Unions
Government ideology and bailout conditionality in the European financial crisis
Room for discretion? Biased decision-making in international financial institutions
Effects of IMF-supported programs on gender inequality
Taxing the People, Not Trade
Accountable to Whom? Public Opinion of Aid Conditionality in Recipient Countries
Preserve, Pressure, Protect, and Peel
Multinational Banks and IMF Conditionality
Aiding together? Europeans’ attitudes on common aid policy
Voters and the IMF
Navigating Regime Complexes in Turbulent Times—The EU’s Interaction with Other International Organizations in Crises
International Negotiations and Domestic Politics
Pleasing the Principal
Structural adjustment and the political economy of capital flight
Formal governance matters
Bargain Down or Shop Around? Outside Options and IMF Conditionality
Private Participation
Bad governance
Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap
IMF = I’M Fired! IMF Program Participation, Political Systems, and Workers’ Rights
Do the Bretton Woods Institutions promote economic transparency
Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (Pema) Dataset
IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’état
Moral Hazard and Financial Crises
Government Ownership of IMF Conditionality Programs
Economic Statecraft by Other Means
The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts
The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism
Unimplementable by design? Understanding (non‐)compliance with International Monetary Fund policy conditionality
Interests over institutions
Biased bureaucrats and the policies of international organizations
Climate Cascades
Beyond neoliberalism? Bilateral central bank swaps and changing global financial governance
The Bretton Woods twins and reform agendas
Power, Hegemony, and World Society Theory
Punching above Weight
Quotas Operandi
Structural adjustment, alienation, and mass protest
How structural adjustment programs affect inequality
Lending Credibility
Securing Approval
The choice for multilateralism
Global horse trading
Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions
IMF programs
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy
Democracy and Development
American politicization of the International Monetary Fund
The effect of IMF programs on economic growth
The political economy of conditionality
The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council
How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations
Canada's IMF executive director
The High Politics of IMF Lending
Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments
Misplaced Blame
The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership
International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy
Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council
Aid
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending
Money Talks
The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force
Coercion Through IOs
The Scope of IMF Conditionality
International Negotiations and Domestic Politics
The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics
The United Nations Security Council and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
The Once and Future Security Council
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
| Unique citing works | 65 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,64 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 65 |