Supporter of stability or agent of agitation? The effect of US foreign policy on coups in Latin America, 1960-99
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3918639 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Clayton L Thyne (0000-0001-8676-6223, University of Kentucky, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 449-461 |
| Publication date | 2010-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343310368350 |
| OpenAlex | W2139914245 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 69 |
| References cited | 33 |
This article takes a two-step approach to improving our understanding of how US foreign policy signals affect the likelihood of coups in Latin America. First, a large body of qualitative literature has developed a 'conventional wisdom' on this subject, suggesting that pressure from the USA plays a key role in stabilizing favored leaders and destabilizing unfavored leaders. Meanwhile, quantitative scholarship analyzing coups focuses almost exclusively on intrastate factors. The first step brings these two bodies of work together by providing quantitative evidence that hostile US signals increase the likelihood of coups, while supportive signals have a stabilizing effect. The second step moves beyond the conventional wisdom by (1) reconsidering theoretical assumptions within the conventional argument and (2) identifying anomalies within the preliminary empirical analyses. These efforts reveal several factors that are likely to impact how coup plotters respond to US signals. Among these factors, empirical analyses indicate that US signals are particularly important when economic dependence on the USA increases, during the middle of a US president's term in office, when they have moderate levels of consistency, and when they specifically mention the military. Overall, the first stage of this article provides a robust confirmation of the conventional wisdom, while the second stage moves the literature down a path that is largely unexplored by previous work
Argument (complex analysis) · Consistency (knowledge bases) · Economics · Empirical evidence · Epistemology · Foreign policy · Latin Americans · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Scholarship · Sociology · Supporter · Work (physics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Engineering · History · Law · Medicine · Political and Social Dynamics in Chile and Latin America · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America · Psychology
Shocks and Turbulence
Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
Archival silences
Statements of Resolve
US Military Deployments and the Risk of Coup d’État
Coups and the End of Mass-Killing Episodes
The Limits of the “Democratic Coup” Thesis
Oil Wealth, Risk Acceptance, and the Seizure of Power
‘Debris’ of Coups D’état
The consequences of CIA-sponsored regime change in Latin America
Leadership turnover, winning coalition size and foreign policy realignment
Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
Coup d’état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950-2008
The International Community's Reaction to Coups
Losing power safely
The political economy of coups d’etat
Autocratic time horizons and the growth effect of foreign direct investment
Our rule is only temporary
What makes coups outside the chain of command in Turkey succeed or fail
Autocratic political cycle and international conflict
The harsh face of the empire by invitation
The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration
Failed coups, political survival, and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes
Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants
The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes
Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies
Routes to Reform
Coups and Revolutions
Popular Dictatorships
A Critical Appraisal of the Tragedies of Military Coups and Political Instability in Guinea (1984-2021)
If You’ll Be My Bodyguard
Covert regime change and ideology
When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants
Combating Coups d’état in Africa, 1950–2014
The Differential Effects of “Democratic” Institutions on Dissent in Dictatorships
The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships and Outside Options for Subordinates
Coup with Adjectives
Coup-proofing
Policy change and coups
Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty
Revisiting Economic Shocks and Coups
Even Generals Need Friends
IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’état
When War Helps Civil–military Relations
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état
Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk
Preventing Coups d’état
Democratic versus Authoritarian Coups
The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War
Cues to Coup Plotters
Entry, Vulnerability, and Trade Policy
Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies
Coup Agency and Prospects for Democracy
An assessment of democratic vulnerability
US hegemony and regime change in Latin America
Midwives or gravediggers of democracy? The military’s impact on democratic development
Defending democracy with international law
Give them toys? Military allocations and regime stability in transitional democracies
Foreign Direct Investment and Authoritarian Stability
Foreign Aid, Time Horizons, and Trade Policy
How Mechanization Shapes Coups
Coup d’État and Democracy
Hegemonía estadounidense y cambio de régimen en América Latina
Grist to the mill of subversion
Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010
Investing in stability
When human capital threatens the Capitol
Coup risk, coup-proofing and leader survival
Economic Sanctions and Civil-Military Relations in Target Countries
Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions (Routledge Revivals)
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Clarify
Kleptocracy and revolutions
The MID 3 data set, 1993–2001
How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict
Greed and grievance in civil war
The Rebel's Dilemma
Secret History
Declassifying U.S. Intervention in Chile
The MID3 Data Set, 1993—2001
Taking Time Seriously
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
Understanding Interaction Models
Latin America's Lost Illusions
Latin American Presidencies Interrupted
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk
The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (Copdab) Project
An Automated Information Extraction Tool for International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict
Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010
Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups D'Etat in Latin America
Latin America's Left Turn
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America
Dependency and Intervention
| Unique citing works | 69 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,6 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 67 |