Cues to Coup Plotters
Elections as Coup Triggers in Dictatorships
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283653 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tore Wig (0000-0003-2596-2399, University of Oslo, corresponding author), Espen Geelmuyden Rød (0000-0003-1976-6746, University of Konstanz) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 787-812 |
| Publication date | 2016-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002714553106 |
| OpenAlex | W2317077900 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 42 |
| References cited | 32 |
A large proportion of coup attempts in autocracies occur in the aftermath of elections, yet little systematic research exists on the topic. Drawing on recent literature on elections in autocracies, we present an argument to explain postelection coups. While we recognize that electoral institutions have the potential to stabilize autocracies, we illustrate that the election event can spark instability when incumbents reveal electoral weakness. Electoral outcomes—in the form of vote shares and opposition reactions—are signals containing information about the strength of the opposition, and indirectly about the likelihood of a successful full-scale revolution that would compromise the privileged positions of regime elites. In these situations, coups are likely to be initiated to avoid a revolution, either by serving as concessions to the opposition or by facilitating increased repression. We perform a large- N study that supports our argument, significantly nuancing the claim that elections stabilize autocracies
Argument (complex analysis · Autocracy · Compromise · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Rare events · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Religion and Society Interactions
Can Authoritarian Electoral Propaganda Compete with the Opposition? Experimental Evidence from Russia
‘Debris’ of Coups D’état
How Dictatorships Work
Elections, Protest, and Authoritarian Regime Stability
Aging gracefully? Why old autocrats hold competitive elections
Strategies of Dictatorship and Military Disloyalty during Anti-Authoritarian Protests
Three Outcomes of Contentious Elections
Election management institutions as catalysts for autocratic transformation
Gender, militaries, and coups during nonviolent uprisings in nondemocracies
When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants
From ballot-boxes to barracks
Citizen Action and Elite Responses
Tough Enough
Autocratic Elections
The Morning After
Strength in Expectation
Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
Subnational Elections and Media Freedom in Autocracies
The Drowning-Out Effect
State capacity and the resilience of electoral authoritarianism
Disaggregating Defection
Propaganda and Protest in Autocracies
The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts
Blatant electoral fraud and the value of a vote
How to Keep Officers in the Barracks
Democracy on the line? Political legitimacy and support for military rule in Africa
An assessment of democratic vulnerability
Electoral cycles of protests and statistical manipulation in autocracies
Revisiting the Relationship Between Legislative Power-Sharing and Autocratic Survival
Pulling the Strings? The Strategic Use of Pro-Government Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes
Coup d’État and Democracy
Elections, Ethnicity, and Political Instability
Dominant Party Rule, Elections, and Cabinet Instability in African Autocracies
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
War Makes the Regime
Clouds with silver linings
Grist to the mill of subversion
Conquering and coercing
Coup d'état and a democratic signal
Election Timing across Autocracy and Democracy (Etad)
Fraud, grievances, and post-election protests in competitive authoritarian regimes
Don't turn around, der Kommissar's in town
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Self-Enforcing Democracy
Private Truths, Public Lies
Democracy and Development
The Logic of Political Survival
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships
Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution
The Guatemalan Coup of 23 March 1982
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
The determinants of democracy
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government
Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections
Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy
Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état
Contracting on Violence
Where to draw the line? From degree to dichotomy in measures of democracy
Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Political Order and One-Party Rule
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule
Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties
Does Oil Hinder Democracy
Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010
Supporter of stability or agent of agitation? The effect of US foreign policy on coups in Latin America, 1960-99
Introducing Archigos
The perils of policy by p-value
War and the Fate of Regimes
| Unique citing works | 42 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,5 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 41 |