Coup d’État and Democracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6244308 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Curtis Bell (0000-0001-6402-4819, One Earth Future Foundation, Broomfield, CO, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 9 |
| Pages | 1167-1200 |
| Publication date | 2016-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010414015621081 |
| OpenAlex | W2309920643 |
| Language | FR |
| Citations received | 39 |
| References cited | 81 |
This article explains coup activity in democracies by adapting insights from the literature on commitment problems and framing coup around the threats leaders and potential coup plotters pose to each other. I claim democratic constraints on executive power inhibit a leader’s ability to repress threats from political rivals. Though this decreases motivations for coup attempts, it also makes democracies more vulnerable should a coup attempt occur. Consequently, democratic constraints on executive power do not reduce the frequency of coup attempts, but coups attempted against democracies are much more likely to succeed. Using several data sets of coup activity and democratic constraints, I find significant differences in coup activity in democracies and non-democracies. Relative to civilian non-democracies, democracies are about half as likely to use coup-related repression, but they face a similar frequency of coup attempts. Plots against democracies are nearly twice as likely to succeed
Democracy · Executive power · Framing (construction · Geography · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · International Development and Aid · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance
Differences matter
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Executive turnovers in sub-Saharan Africa
US Military Deployments and the Risk of Coup d’État
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The role of freedom of communication in modulating the effect of political participation on electoral outcome in Africa
Leaving the Barracks
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Sourcing and Bias in the Study of Coups
Bin-Conditional Conformal Prediction of Fatalities from Armed Conflict
Deterring threats and settling scores
Democratic breakdown and terrorism
The harsh face of the empire by invitation
Military in the cabinet and defense spending of civilian governments
Why do military dictatorships become presidential democracies? Mapping the democratic interests of autocratic regimes
When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants
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From Bullets to Balance Sheets
Rise and Fall of the “Guardians of the State”? A Comparative Study of Coup Culture in Argentina, Turkey and Thailand
Diktatorenendspiel
No Easy Way Out
Opportunistic legislation under a natural emergency
Do bilateral investment treaties help post-coup countries attract foreign investment
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An assessment of democratic vulnerability
Give them toys? Military allocations and regime stability in transitional democracies
Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies
Auxiliary Force Structure
How Mechanization Shapes Coups
Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield
Democratic Breakdown and the Hidden Perils of the Democratic Peace
Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d'état
Power Sharing and Coups d'état in Postconflict Settings
Institutional Arsenals for Democracy? The Postcoup Effects of Conscript Militaries
Between Coups and Election
Political Order in Changing Societies
Paradigms and Sand Castles
Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters
Statistics notes
Fractionalization
Man on Horseback; the Role of the Military in Politics
The Logic of Political Survival
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Democracy and Redistribution
Coup d’état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950-2008
Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations 1
The International Community's Reaction to Coups
Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état
Trading coups for civil war
Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967–99
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies
The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes
Coup-proofing
Democracy and Victory
Coups d’état and defense spending
Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat
Personal Rule in Black Africa
Constrained Concessions
Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy
The soldier and the state
Ethnic groups in conflict
Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
Back to the Future
Economic Origins of Democratic Breakdown? The Redistributive Model and the Postcolonial State
Revisiting Economic Shocks and Coups
Looking for Audience Costs
The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War
Coordination, Learning, and Coups
Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état
The "Coup Contagion" Hypothesis
The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War
Cues to Coup Plotters
Buying Support and Buying Time
Does Democratization Reduce the Risk of Military Interventions in Politics in Africa
Labor and Pacted Democracy
Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem
Civil-Military Relations
Arguing for a Negligible Effect
Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment
Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes
A Probabilistic Approach to the Causes of Coups d'Etat
Coups and Democracy
The Enemy Within
Theories of international regimes
International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs
Patronage and Political Stability in Africa
Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations
Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution
Coups d'État in Africa
Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010
War and the Survival of Political Leaders
Spain Tries Democracy Again
Supporter of stability or agent of agitation? The effect of US foreign policy on coups in Latin America, 1960-99
Introducing Archigos
Military Role and Rule
The Guardianship Dilemma
Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat, 1960-1982
Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory
Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation
The Predictability of Coups d'état
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial Africa, 1957-1984
| Unique citing works | 39 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,9 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 39 |