The Guardianship Dilemma
Regime Securitythroughandfromthe Armed Forces
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3572229 |
|---|---|
| Authors | R Blake Mcmahon (0000-0002-6943-3520, University of California San Diego), Branislav L Slantchev (0000-0003-3404-5242, University of California San Diego) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 109 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 297-313 |
| Publication date | 2015-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055415000131 |
| OpenAlex | W2145293964 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 68 |
| References cited | 39 |
Armed forces strong enough to protect the state also pose a threat to the state. We develop a model that distills this "Guardianship Dilemma" to its barest essentials, and show that the seemingly ironclad logic underlying our existing understanding of civil-military relations is flawed. Militaries contemplating disloyalty must worry about both successfully overthrowing the governmentanddefeating the state's opponent. This twin challenge induces loyalty as the state faces increasingly strong external threats, and can be managed effectively by rulers using a number of policy levers. Disloyalty can still occur when political and military elites hold divergent beliefs about the threat environment facing the state, since militaries will sometimes have less incentive to remain loyal than the ruler suspects. Consequently, it is not the need to respond to external threats that raises the risk of disloyalty-as conventional wisdom suggests-but rather uncertainty about the severity of these threats
Adversary · Computer security · Dilemma · Government (linguistics · International law · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Ruler · Security Dilemma · Sociology · State (computer science · Use of force · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
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| Unique citing works | 68 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,18 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 68 |