Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations
Evidence from Autocratic Argentina
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231019 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adam Scharpf (0000-0001-6665-9025, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies), Christian Gläßel (0000-0002-0041-3855, University of Mannheim) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 791-806 |
| Publication date | 2020-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12475 |
| OpenAlex | W2976148746 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
| References cited | 50 |
Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low‐performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low‐achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown
Autocracy · Bureaucracy · Business · Consolidation (business · Democracy · Economics · Face (sociological concept · Hierarchy · Incentive · Market economy · Monopoly · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Social science · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
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| Unique citing works | 28 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,67 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |