Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284549 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tobias Böhmelt (0000-0002-7661-8670, University of Essex, corresponding author), Abel Escribà-Folch, Abel Escribà‐folch (0000-0001-7344-1585, Departament de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain), Ulrich Pilster (University of Essex) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1111-1139 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002718789744 |
| OpenAlex | W2887369504 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 27 |
| References cited | 65 |
Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establish networks among military officers that may facilitate coordination necessary for plotting a putsch. We also contend and empirically demonstrate that these negative side effects of military academies are in particular pronounced in nondemocracies, that is, military academies have diverse effects across regime types. This work has significant implications for our understanding civil–military relations. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on military education and professionalization, as we suggest that military academies are important vehicles through which coups can emerge predominantly in authoritarian states
Authoritarianism · Civil–military relations · Democracy · Military personnel · Military relations · Military science · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Professionalization · Public relations · Sociology · Work (physics · Engineering · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration
The Road to Repression
From Training to Influence
Too Many to Fight
I want you…or not? The effect of conscription on coup risk in anocracies
The political economy of expedience
Coups and the End of Mass-Killing Episodes
Go Big or Go Home? Right-Sizing Security Cooperation to Fragile States
US Military Deployments and the Risk of Coup d’État
Post-2016 military restructuring in Turkey from the perspective of coup-proofing
How Mosul fell
Peacekeeping Prevention
Bread, butter, barricade
U.S. Military Training, External Support, and Security Defections during Nonviolent Resistance
Oil discovery, oil production, and coups d’état
Cynicism, Political Extremism, and Associated Factors in Military Service Academies
Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War
Institutionalized Defense Cooperation and Regime Security
Educational Change through Bureaucratic Effectiveness
Can't coalesce, can't constrain
Why Governments Have Their Troops Trained Abroad
Elite bargains and policy priorities in authoritarian regimes
The dictator’s legionnaires
Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies
How Mechanization Shapes Coups
Don't turn around, der Kommissar's in town
What Makes a Military Professional? Evaluating Norm Socialization in West Point Cadets
Presidents and Generals
The professional soldier
Authoritarian Brazil
Military institutions and coercion in the developing nations
Political and Military Sociology
Paradigms and Sand Castles
Rethinking Military Politics
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Seizing Power
Resistance and Rebellion
Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters
Man on Horseback; the Role of the Military in Politics
The Military in Politics
Networks of Rebellion
The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution
Naval Forces and Civil-Military Relations
Why Professionalize? Economic Modernization and Military Professionalism1
Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations 1
Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967–99
External threats and political survival
The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes
Coup-proofing
Small footprint, small payoff
Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat
Soldiers in Politics
The Education of Military Elites
The soldier and the state
Ethnic groups in conflict
Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
Back to the Future
When War Helps Civil–military Relations
Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état
The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War
How to Keep Officers in the Barracks
Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East
The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East
Staying Quartered
Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes
Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years
Civil-Military Relations
Social Networks and Collective Action
From Disaffection to Desertion
US professional military education and democratization abroad
The Enemy Within
Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871
Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010
Social Networks and Social Movements
A differentcoup d'état
Supporter of stability or agent of agitation? The effect of US foreign policy on coups in Latin America, 1960-99
When human capital threatens the Capitol
The Party in Uniform
The Guardianship Dilemma
Organizing Rebellion
Military Professionalism and Professional Militarism in Brazil, 1870-1970
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
The Essence of Military Group Cohesion
Cohesion through socialization
| Unique citing works | 27 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,86 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 27 |