Abel Escribà‐folch
Biographic Data
| ID | 3578465 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Abel Escribà‐folch |
| GIVEN NAMES | Abel |
| FAMILY NAME | Escribà‐folch |
| SIGNATURE | FOLCH A E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7344-1585 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 32 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 720 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 32 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 13 |
Foreign aid, FDI and the personalization of power in autocracies
This article examines the relationship between foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) and the degree of personalism in dictatorships. We contend that aid leads to higher personalism since it is a windfall that accrues to the government and does not require cooperation from elites to obtain it. Contrarily, we posit that FDI is linked to lower levels of personalism because it reshapes elites’ incentives and influence as they may acquire ne…
The trajectories of personalization: How Dictators Accumulate Power Over Time
Can Social Media Help Incumbents Subvert Democracy
Can leaders' use of social media contribute to democratic backsliding? Extant research concludes that political leaders use social media mostly as a broadcasting tool and to engage in limited substantive dialogue. In this article, we propose a supply-side theory of how social media may contribute to the processes associated with democratic backsliding. We argue that incumbents use Twitter (X), among other purposes, to dynamically discover the pol…
Foreign Legionnaires and Military Mutinies
The composition of the armed forces is, by now, well established as a major factor determining the risk of coups d’état. However, military discontent not only manifests in the form of coups but also as mutinies. This latter form of troop rebellion has received little empirical attention. We examine how the practice of recruiting foreigners into the armed forces affects the likelihood of such events and develop two arguments regarding a direct and…
Preventing Dissent: Secret Police and Protests in Dictatorships
This article examines the impact of secret police organizations on the occurrence of antiregime protests in authoritarian regimes. We argue that such organizations are related to lower levels of protests via two related mechanisms: intelligence gathering and an increased perception of risk among citizens, which reduce citizens' ability and willingness to mobilize, respectively. Using new data on secret police organizations in dictatorships coveri…
The dictator’s legionnaires: Foreign Recruitment, Coups, and Uprisings
Several countries recruit foreign nationals into their armed forces. This is despite the norm of citizen armies and the strong idea that individuals join the military to defend their home country while military service socializes them into good citizens. We argue that foreign recruits can have very specific benefits for some authoritarian governments. Because they lack strong links to society, their loyalties lie with whoever recruited and pays t…
How Mechanization Shapes Coups
Civil-military relations are characterized by a fundamental dilemma. To lower coup risk, leaders frequently empower the military, which satisfies the armed forces with the status quo and enables them to fight against threats challenging the civilian leadership. Simultaneously, a too powerful military itself constitutes a potential threat that is capable of overthrowing the government. Our research adds to this debate by examining the impact of me…
The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships
How do failed coups influence power personalization in dictatorships? While scholars have studied the mechanisms of personalism in dictatorships in detail, little attention has been paid to the timing and determinants of surges in personalism levels. In this article, we propose that personalism can evolve non-linearly, and show that large, quite rapid increases in personalization by dictators occur after a failed coup attempt. The logic is that f…
Migration and Democracy: How Remittances Undermine Dictatorships
In the growing body of work on democracy, little attention has been paid to its links with migration. This book focuses on the effects of worker remittances—money sent by migrants back to their home countries—and how these resources shape political action in the Global South. Remittances are not only the largest source of foreign income in most autocratic countries, but also, in contrast to foreign aid or international investment, flow directly t…
Migration and Democracy: How Remittances Undermine Dictatorships
I’ll Be Back? Exiled Leaders and Political Instability
Exile is often considered a useful political solution that can coax violent or unpopular leaders out of power. But these “golden parachutes” may come with a price. Specifically, do exiled leaders increase instability back in their home countries? In this paper, we outline the mechanisms through which exiled rulers can destabilize their home state’s politics and ultimately increase conflict. We present two types of evidence to support the argument…
Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations
Dictators shape regime structures to counter the threats they face. Personalization entails the progressive accumulation of power in the hands of the dictator to minimize internal threats from organized elites in the military and party. However, elites have incentives to resist the personalization to avoid being marginalized by personalist strongmen. We argue that as personalism increases, rival elites, less able to coordinate coup attempts, turn…
The Effects of Autocratic Characteristics on Public Opinion toward Democracy Promotion Policies: A Conjoint Analysis
Does the level of public support for democracy promotion policies vary with the characteristics of potential autocratic targets? We conduct an experimental study with a conjoint design on a sample of 1,464 US citizens that manipulates several core characteristics of potential autocratic targets. We then compare citizens’ preferences with the cross-national evidence testing the determinants of democracy promotion success. We find that respondents …
Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies
How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quant…
Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk
Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establis…
Remittances and Protest in Dictatorships
Remittances—money migrant workers send back home—are the second largest source of international financial flows in developing countries. As with other sources of international finance, such as foreign direct investment and foreign aid, worker remittances shape politics in recipient countries. We examine the political consequences of remittances by exploring how they influence antigovernment protest behavior. While recent research argues that remi…
Dictators in Exile: Explaining the Destinations of Ex-Rulers
Exile has been the second most common fate for dictators who lost office since World War II, yet scholars know little about this phenomenon. In this article, we ask a simple yet previously unanswered question: where do exiled dictators go? We argue that three sets of factors—transnational ties, geographic proximity, and monadic characteristics of potential host states—influence where dictators flee. For evidence, we use original data on exile des…
Foreign direct investment and the risk of regime transition in autocracies
Economic globalization and, in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) have often been considered to be catalysts for economic reform and political liberalization. It is argued that openness to foreign investment spurs democratization by empowering pro-liberalization actors and undermining elite cohesion. This article explores and tests three alternative hypotheses linking FDI and autocratic regime survival. The liberalization hypothesis clai…
The determinants of low-intensity intergroup violence: The case of Northern Ireland
What accounts for low-intensity intergroup violence? This article explores the determinants of low-intensity sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, which has marked the post-1998 peace agreement period. Low-intensity violence comprises a variety of events from riots to attacks against other civilians as well as against homes and symbolic buildings such as churches. We argue that this violence is more likely and prevalent in interface areas where…
Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival
Can coercive foreign policy destabilise autocratic regimes? Can democracy be promoted from abroad? This book examines how foreign policy tools such as aid, economic sanctions, human rights shaming and prosecutions, and military intervention influence the survival of autocratic regimes.
Remittances and Democratization
Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances—money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country—differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances t…
Human Rights Prosecutions and Autocratic Survival
Do human rights prosecutions deter dictatorships from relinquishing power? Advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries. However, prosecuting officials for past crimes may jeopardize the prospects of regime change in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. The creation of the International Criminal Court has further revitalized this debate. This article assesses how hum…
Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy
Along with the mobilization of political support, repression is one of the two basic instruments dictators use to stay in power. Yet, there is no systematic investigation analyzing whether repression actually helps dictators retain power. This article fills this gap by addressing the simultaneous relationship between survival and repression. The results reveal that repression certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival. Furthermore,…
Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004
For some political leaders losing power might entail further punishment than just being replaced. During the period 1946–2004, 47% of dictators have been jailed, killed, or had to go into exile as a consequence of losing power. The possibility that such punishment occurs can shape and condition present-time decisions rulers make. This article investigates the factors which may affect the fate of outgoing dictators. I find that regime types determ…
Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy
This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties – even when devised to quell internal threats – can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus…
Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers1
This paper examines whether economic sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers. We argue that the effect of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Because personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) to fund patronage, rulers in these regimes are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than lead…
Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy
This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties – even when devised to quell internal threats – can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus…
Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy
Along with the mobilization of political support, repression is one of the two basic instruments dictators use to stay in power. Yet, there is no systematic investigation analyzing whether repression actually helps dictators retain power. This article fills this gap by addressing the simultaneous relationship between survival and repression. The results reveal that repression certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival. Furthermore,…
Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions
This article explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition. Rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. When budget constraints are severe, dictators are more likely to increase repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending …
Remittances and Democratization
Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances—money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country—differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances t…
Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004
For some political leaders losing power might entail further punishment than just being replaced. During the period 1946–2004, 47% of dictators have been jailed, killed, or had to go into exile as a consequence of losing power. The possibility that such punishment occurs can shape and condition present-time decisions rulers make. This article investigates the factors which may affect the fate of outgoing dictators. I find that regime types determ…
Remittances and Protest in Dictatorships
Remittances—money migrant workers send back home—are the second largest source of international financial flows in developing countries. As with other sources of international finance, such as foreign direct investment and foreign aid, worker remittances shape politics in recipient countries. We examine the political consequences of remittances by exploring how they influence antigovernment protest behavior. While recent research argues that remi…
Human Rights Prosecutions and Autocratic Survival
Do human rights prosecutions deter dictatorships from relinquishing power? Advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries. However, prosecuting officials for past crimes may jeopardize the prospects of regime change in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. The creation of the International Criminal Court has further revitalized this debate. This article assesses how hum…
Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk
Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establis…
The determinants of low-intensity intergroup violence: The case of Northern Ireland
What accounts for low-intensity intergroup violence? This article explores the determinants of low-intensity sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, which has marked the post-1998 peace agreement period. Low-intensity violence comprises a variety of events from riots to attacks against other civilians as well as against homes and symbolic buildings such as churches. We argue that this violence is more likely and prevalent in interface areas where…
Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations
Dictators shape regime structures to counter the threats they face. Personalization entails the progressive accumulation of power in the hands of the dictator to minimize internal threats from organized elites in the military and party. However, elites have incentives to resist the personalization to avoid being marginalized by personalist strongmen. We argue that as personalism increases, rival elites, less able to coordinate coup attempts, turn…
Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies
How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quant…
Foreign direct investment and the risk of regime transition in autocracies
Economic globalization and, in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) have often been considered to be catalysts for economic reform and political liberalization. It is argued that openness to foreign investment spurs democratization by empowering pro-liberalization actors and undermining elite cohesion. This article explores and tests three alternative hypotheses linking FDI and autocratic regime survival. The liberalization hypothesis clai…
The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships
How do failed coups influence power personalization in dictatorships? While scholars have studied the mechanisms of personalism in dictatorships in detail, little attention has been paid to the timing and determinants of surges in personalism levels. In this article, we propose that personalism can evolve non-linearly, and show that large, quite rapid increases in personalization by dictators occur after a failed coup attempt. The logic is that f…
Dictators in Exile: Explaining the Destinations of Ex-Rulers
Exile has been the second most common fate for dictators who lost office since World War II, yet scholars know little about this phenomenon. In this article, we ask a simple yet previously unanswered question: where do exiled dictators go? We argue that three sets of factors—transnational ties, geographic proximity, and monadic characteristics of potential host states—influence where dictators flee. For evidence, we use original data on exile des…
Learning, political regimes and the liberalisation of trade: Learning, Political Regimes and the Liberalisation of Trade
Economic sanctions and the duration of civil conflicts
This article studies the impact of economic sanctions on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflicts. Sanctions are argued to foster the convergence of beliefs over parties' capacity, to reduce the utility of victory and to increase the costs of continuing fighting. Using a sample of 87 wars and new data on sanctions and sanction types, the author shows that sanctions and their durations are statistically associated with shorter intrastate c…
How Mechanization Shapes Coups
Civil-military relations are characterized by a fundamental dilemma. To lower coup risk, leaders frequently empower the military, which satisfies the armed forces with the status quo and enables them to fight against threats challenging the civilian leadership. Simultaneously, a too powerful military itself constitutes a potential threat that is capable of overthrowing the government. Our research adds to this debate by examining the impact of me…
Group strength, accountability and growth under dictatorship
This article tests the hypothesis that group power affects development policy by holding dictators accountable through different mechanisms. New data on dictators’ modes of exit for the period 1946—2000 allow us to estimate the predicted likelihood that a given authoritarian head of government will be toppled by the elite, the military or the citizenry. When the predicted odds are used as a measure of group strength, the results of simple growth …
I’ll Be Back? Exiled Leaders and Political Instability
Exile is often considered a useful political solution that can coax violent or unpopular leaders out of power. But these “golden parachutes” may come with a price. Specifically, do exiled leaders increase instability back in their home countries? In this paper, we outline the mechanisms through which exiled rulers can destabilize their home state’s politics and ultimately increase conflict. We present two types of evidence to support the argument…
Preventing Dissent: Secret Police and Protests in Dictatorships
This article examines the impact of secret police organizations on the occurrence of antiregime protests in authoritarian regimes. We argue that such organizations are related to lower levels of protests via two related mechanisms: intelligence gathering and an increased perception of risk among citizens, which reduce citizens' ability and willingness to mobilize, respectively. Using new data on secret police organizations in dictatorships coveri…
The dictator’s legionnaires: Foreign Recruitment, Coups, and Uprisings
Several countries recruit foreign nationals into their armed forces. This is despite the norm of citizen armies and the strong idea that individuals join the military to defend their home country while military service socializes them into good citizens. We argue that foreign recruits can have very specific benefits for some authoritarian governments. Because they lack strong links to society, their loyalties lie with whoever recruited and pays t…
The Effects of Autocratic Characteristics on Public Opinion toward Democracy Promotion Policies: A Conjoint Analysis
Does the level of public support for democracy promotion policies vary with the characteristics of potential autocratic targets? We conduct an experimental study with a conjoint design on a sample of 1,464 US citizens that manipulates several core characteristics of potential autocratic targets. We then compare citizens’ preferences with the cross-national evidence testing the determinants of democracy promotion success. We find that respondents …
Participação arriscada: Manifestações e tumultos em regimes ditatoriais
Dans cet article, on contrôle de façon empirique, tout en utilisant un large échantillon de pays, les différentes théories sur dissension et protestation au coeur des régimes autoritaires, où ces activités sont souvent traquées et forcément périlleuses. Les résultats empiriques de l'analyse comparative longitudinale confirment les prévisions de l'approche économique rationnelle à propos de la protestation politique, ainsi que le pouvoir d'explica…
The Multidimensionality of Political Representation: An Empirical Test on Spanish Political Parties and Voters
Political representation is a complex concept due to its multidimensional and contested nature. This lack of unequivocal meaning has triggered a theoretical dispute about what ‘acting for others’ should actually involve. In this article we argue that the main actors involved in the process of political representation (political parties and the electorate) also hold alternative conceptions. In an attempt to link political theory to empirical analy…
Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers1
This paper examines whether economic sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers. We argue that the effect of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Because personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) to fund patronage, rulers in these regimes are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than lead…
Economic sanctions and the duration of civil conflicts
This article studies the impact of economic sanctions on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflicts. Sanctions are argued to foster the convergence of beliefs over parties' capacity, to reduce the utility of victory and to increase the costs of continuing fighting. Using a sample of 87 wars and new data on sanctions and sanction types, the author shows that sanctions and their durations are statistically associated with shorter intrastate c…
Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions
This article explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition. Rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. When budget constraints are severe, dictators are more likely to increase repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending …
Group strength, accountability and growth under dictatorship
This article tests the hypothesis that group power affects development policy by holding dictators accountable through different mechanisms. New data on dictators’ modes of exit for the period 1946—2000 allow us to estimate the predicted likelihood that a given authoritarian head of government will be toppled by the elite, the military or the citizenry. When the predicted odds are used as a measure of group strength, the results of simple growth …
Learning, political regimes and the liberalisation of trade: Learning, Political Regimes and the Liberalisation of Trade
Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy
This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties – even when devised to quell internal threats – can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus…
Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy
Along with the mobilization of political support, repression is one of the two basic instruments dictators use to stay in power. Yet, there is no systematic investigation analyzing whether repression actually helps dictators retain power. This article fills this gap by addressing the simultaneous relationship between survival and repression. The results reveal that repression certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival. Furthermore,…
Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004
For some political leaders losing power might entail further punishment than just being replaced. During the period 1946–2004, 47% of dictators have been jailed, killed, or had to go into exile as a consequence of losing power. The possibility that such punishment occurs can shape and condition present-time decisions rulers make. This article investigates the factors which may affect the fate of outgoing dictators. I find that regime types determ…
Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival
Can coercive foreign policy destabilise autocratic regimes? Can democracy be promoted from abroad? This book examines how foreign policy tools such as aid, economic sanctions, human rights shaming and prosecutions, and military intervention influence the survival of autocratic regimes.
Remittances and Democratization
Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances—money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country—differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances t…
Human Rights Prosecutions and Autocratic Survival
Do human rights prosecutions deter dictatorships from relinquishing power? Advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries. However, prosecuting officials for past crimes may jeopardize the prospects of regime change in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. The creation of the International Criminal Court has further revitalized this debate. This article assesses how hum…
The determinants of low-intensity intergroup violence: The case of Northern Ireland
What accounts for low-intensity intergroup violence? This article explores the determinants of low-intensity sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, which has marked the post-1998 peace agreement period. Low-intensity violence comprises a variety of events from riots to attacks against other civilians as well as against homes and symbolic buildings such as churches. We argue that this violence is more likely and prevalent in interface areas where…
Dictators in Exile: Explaining the Destinations of Ex-Rulers
Exile has been the second most common fate for dictators who lost office since World War II, yet scholars know little about this phenomenon. In this article, we ask a simple yet previously unanswered question: where do exiled dictators go? We argue that three sets of factors—transnational ties, geographic proximity, and monadic characteristics of potential host states—influence where dictators flee. For evidence, we use original data on exile des…
Foreign direct investment and the risk of regime transition in autocracies
Economic globalization and, in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) have often been considered to be catalysts for economic reform and political liberalization. It is argued that openness to foreign investment spurs democratization by empowering pro-liberalization actors and undermining elite cohesion. This article explores and tests three alternative hypotheses linking FDI and autocratic regime survival. The liberalization hypothesis clai…
Remittances and Protest in Dictatorships
Remittances—money migrant workers send back home—are the second largest source of international financial flows in developing countries. As with other sources of international finance, such as foreign direct investment and foreign aid, worker remittances shape politics in recipient countries. We examine the political consequences of remittances by exploring how they influence antigovernment protest behavior. While recent research argues that remi…
Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies
How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quant…
Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk
Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establis…
The Effects of Autocratic Characteristics on Public Opinion toward Democracy Promotion Policies: A Conjoint Analysis
Does the level of public support for democracy promotion policies vary with the characteristics of potential autocratic targets? We conduct an experimental study with a conjoint design on a sample of 1,464 US citizens that manipulates several core characteristics of potential autocratic targets. We then compare citizens’ preferences with the cross-national evidence testing the determinants of democracy promotion success. We find that respondents …
Migration and Democracy: How Remittances Undermine Dictatorships
In the growing body of work on democracy, little attention has been paid to its links with migration. This book focuses on the effects of worker remittances—money sent by migrants back to their home countries—and how these resources shape political action in the Global South. Remittances are not only the largest source of foreign income in most autocratic countries, but also, in contrast to foreign aid or international investment, flow directly t…
Migration and Democracy: How Remittances Undermine Dictatorships
I’ll Be Back? Exiled Leaders and Political Instability
Exile is often considered a useful political solution that can coax violent or unpopular leaders out of power. But these “golden parachutes” may come with a price. Specifically, do exiled leaders increase instability back in their home countries? In this paper, we outline the mechanisms through which exiled rulers can destabilize their home state’s politics and ultimately increase conflict. We present two types of evidence to support the argument…
Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations
Dictators shape regime structures to counter the threats they face. Personalization entails the progressive accumulation of power in the hands of the dictator to minimize internal threats from organized elites in the military and party. However, elites have incentives to resist the personalization to avoid being marginalized by personalist strongmen. We argue that as personalism increases, rival elites, less able to coordinate coup attempts, turn…
How Mechanization Shapes Coups
Civil-military relations are characterized by a fundamental dilemma. To lower coup risk, leaders frequently empower the military, which satisfies the armed forces with the status quo and enables them to fight against threats challenging the civilian leadership. Simultaneously, a too powerful military itself constitutes a potential threat that is capable of overthrowing the government. Our research adds to this debate by examining the impact of me…
Political science (31 works) · Politics (29 works) · Political economy (26 works) · Democracy (25 works) · Law (25 works) · Economics (24 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (23 works) · Law (22 works) · Sociology (17 works) · Autocracy (15 works)