I’ll Be Back? Exiled Leaders and Political Instability

Bibliographic Data

ID10071879
AuthorsDaniel Krcmaric (0000-0002-8862-7013, Northwestern University, corresponding author), Abel Escribà‐folch (0000-0001-7344-1585, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, Barcelona, Spain)
Year2022
Volume67
Issue2-3
Pages402-427
Publication date2022-07-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00220027221115622
OpenAlexW4286216352
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited53

Exile is often considered a useful political solution that can coax violent or unpopular leaders out of power. But these “golden parachutes” may come with a price. Specifically, do exiled leaders increase instability back in their home countries? In this paper, we outline the mechanisms through which exiled rulers can destabilize their home state’s politics and ultimately increase conflict. We present two types of evidence to support the argument. The first is a cross-national analysis that uses our original Leaders in Exile dataset to examine how exiled leaders shape the likelihood of civil conflicts, coups, and protests. The second is a cross-leader analysis designed to minimize inferential concerns by comparing cases where leaders escape into exile with cases where leaders are killed. In both tests, we find that exiled leaders are linked to political instability in their home countries

Argument (complex analysis · Civil Conflict · Development economics · Economics · Instability · Political economy · Political instability · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · State (computer science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Medicine · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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