Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071804 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter B White (0000-0002-9143-129X, Auburn University, Auburn, AL, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 938-963 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-23 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027231185575 |
| OpenAlex | W4381891666 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 46 |
A critical element in civil wars is military fragmentation. Yet, we have a limited understanding of why military elites fight in civil wars and on what side. In this article I develop a theory of the economic and professional motivations of military elites. I test this theory using the case of West Point graduates in the American Civil War. I argue that in addition to home state, economic and professional interests were a major influence on West Pointers. Graduates with connections to Southern cash crops were less likely to fight for the Union and more likely to fight for the Confederacy. Higher ranking graduates were more likely to fight for both sides, as they were better positioned to compete for promotion. I test this argument using a new dataset of more than 1000 West Point graduates’ wartime allegiances and antebellum careers and find strong evidence in support of my expectations
Argument (complex analysis · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Test (biology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Law · Public Administration
Divided Armies
Seizing Power
Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador
The Soldier and the State
Why Men Rebel
Barriers to Peace in Civil War
When Soldiers Rebel
Greed and grievance in civil war
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
Leadership and Military Effectiveness
Second-Class’
Soldiers in Revolt
Situating soldiers’ demands
How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars
Unequal We Fight
Exit, Resistance, Loyalty
The Ontology of “Political Violence
State breakdown and Army-Splinter Rebellions
Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk
Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment
The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War
Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes
Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow
Allegiance, Ability, and Achievement in the American Civil War
Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of Surrender Across Battles
Veto Players and Civil War Duration
Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War
Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion
A Leap of Faith
Rogues, degenerates, and heroes
Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining
Why Do Soldiers Give Up? A Self-Preservation Theory of Surrender
Triangulating horizontal inequality
Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy
The limits of socialization and the underproduction of military violence
The spoils of nature
The downstream effects of combatant fragmentation on civil war recurrence
Organizing Rebellion
Collective Threat Framing and Mobilization in Civil War
The Political Economy of the Cotton South
For a fistful of pesetas? The political economy of the army in a nonconsolidated democracy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |