State breakdown and Army-Splinter Rebellions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285352 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Theodore Mclauchlin (0000-0003-3759-2241, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 66-93 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027221112030 |
| OpenAlex | W4283792145 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 72 |
In Afghanistan, Libya, Liberia and beyond, armed rebellions have begun when armies fell apart. When does this occur? This paper conducts a large-N analysis of these army-splinter rebellions, distinct from both non-military rebellions from below and from coups, using new data. It finds that they follow a logic of state breakdown focusing on regime characteristics (personalist regimes and the loss of superpower support at the end of the Cold War) rather than drivers of mass mobilization from below. In contrast, these regime-level factors matter much less for the non-military rebellions from below that dominate theorizing about civil war origins. This paper also shows that one option for military rebels lies in not attempting a coup but instead heading straight into a rebellion. This paper thus distinguishes highly different paths to armed conflict, validates the state breakdown approach to why armies fall apart, and extends the well-known tradeoff between coups and civil wars
Cartography · Cold war · Democracy · Development economics · Economic history · Economics · Fell · Geography · Heading (navigation · Mobilization · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Regime change · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · State (computer science · Superpower · History · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
Divided Armies
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Seizing Power
The Dictator's Army
Warlord Politics and African States
Balkan tragedy
Quasi-States
States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control
How Dictatorships Work
How Insurgency Begins
Why civil resistance works
Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa
Desertion
Networks of Rebellion
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War
Greed and grievance in civil war
Civil War
The Efficacy of Ethnic Stacking
Moral Economies of Mass Violence
Why Are the Longest Insurgencies Low Violence? Politician Motivations, Sons of the Soil, and Civil War Duration
Trading coups for civil war
The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration
Generals, Dictators, and Kings
The Security-Force Ethnicity (SFE) Project
Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations
The Ethnic Stacking in Africa Dataset
The More Fragmented the Better?—The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings
Coup-proofing
Friends Like These
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
The security dilemma and ethnic conflict
Defect or Defend
Living by the Gun In Chad
Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships
Back to the Future
Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions
Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars
Jumping on the Bandwagon
The Ethnic Army and the State
Preventing Coups d’état
When Organizations Rebel
Coup-Proofing in the Shadow of Intervention
Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of Surrender Across Battles
Rumors, Kinship Networks, and Rebel Group Formation
Rationalist explanations for war
How Does Ethnic Rebellion Start
Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield
Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War
Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion
The Big Problem of Small Allies
Going on the Run
Civil war as a social process
Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring
Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis
Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010
Mapping coercive institutions
Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars
Organized violence, 1989-2017
Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War
Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring
Ethnicity and civil war
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others
International System and Technologies of Rebellion
Strongmen and Straw Men
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |