Personalist Regime and Rebel Sponsorship in Civil Conflicts

Bibliographic Data

ID6284973
AuthorsRuixing Cao (0000-0002-9581-5207, University of Duisburg-Essen, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume69
Issue7-8
Pages1407-1432
Publication date2025-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027241297641
OpenAlexW4404568660
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited51

Under what conditions do sponsors directly intervene in the target state’s civil conflicts? While previous research on state sponsorship for the rebels tends to focus on how ties between the two can influence their interactions, this article argues that the sponsor is more willing to provide combat support when the target state is under the rule of a personalist regime. Due to a lack of internal constraints, personalist leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies. The high degree of policy flexibility also makes personalist regimes unreliable partners for negotiation. To avoid future instability, rival states are more likely to use civil conflicts as opportunities to weaken the personalist regime. Military ineffectiveness under personalist regimes also lowers the cost of combat support and potentially allows sponsors to reap more material benefits from the civil conflict. Utilizing comprehensive data on personalism and rebel sponsorship, I find support for this argument

Argument (complex analysis · Economic system · Economics · Flexibility (engineering · Law and economics · Management · Negotiation · Personalism · Political economy · Political science · Public relations · Sociology · State (computer science · International Development and Aid · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance

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