Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability
How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3324907 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alicia Meng (0000-0002-0686-3734, University of Virginia, corresponding author), Jack Paine (0000-0002-2213-7687, University of Rochester, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 116 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1208-1225 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055422000296 |
| OpenAlex | W4223648352 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 44 |
| References cited | 41 |
Regimes founded in rebellion are, typically, extremely durable. We propose that this stability is founded upon peaceful power sharing between the rebel regime leader and military elites. Amid long and intense fighting, rebel leaders must delegate control to top military commanders because doing so helps them to win battles. After seizing power, power-sharing deals between former combatants are highly credible due to their history of interactions, which mitigates the guardianship dilemma. Elsewhere, a persistent internal security dilemma often undermines power-sharing deals. Using originally collected data on African regimes from 1960 to 2017, we establish that rebel regimes break down seldomly compared with other authoritarian regimes and they experience fewer coups. Regarding the mechanism, rebel regimes more frequently share power with military elites by appointing a Minister of Defense. These Ministers are typically high-ranking members of the rebellion, which reflects the regime's replacement of the state military with their own
Authoritarianism · Delegate · Democracy · Dilemma · Law and economics · Legal guardian · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Power sharing · Security Dilemma · Sociology · State (computer science · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance
Rebel Victory and Authoritarian (Dis)Order
Practicing Power‐Sharing
Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing
Authoritarian Regime Origin and the Emergence of Territorial Contenders
Variants of violence
Rebel victory and constitutional change
Economic, Social, and Political Elites in Mena Political Science
Territorial consolidation after rebel victory
Legacies of Victors’ Rebel Governance
The Clashing Legacies of EPLF Rebel Governance in Post-Independent Eritrea
Post-Conflict Regimes and the Survival of Pro-Government Militias
The long-term effects of Coin operations on military regime stability
Personalism and the politics of central bank independence under authoritarianism
Patronage and authoritarian co-optation of the military
Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy
Networks of coercion
The economic foundations of powersharing
Civil-Military Relations in the Aftermath of Coups
Signaling Strength Through Power Sharing
Targeted Sanctions Against Authoritarian Elites
From Politicization to Vigilance
Institutionalized Defense Cooperation and Regime Security
Comrades in Arms? Rebel Leadership Roles and Coups in Rebel Regimes
Unconditional Loyalty
Elite Threats and Punitive Violence in Autocratic Regimes
The Politburos of Communist Eastern Europe
Coercive Legacies
The bureaucratic politics of authoritarian repression
Large-N Qualitative Analysis (LNQA)
Personalist Regime and Rebel Sponsorship in Civil Conflicts
Was “The Revo” a coup d'etat? An assessment of the 1979 regime change in Grenada
The trajectories of personalization
Elite strategy in resilient authoritarianism
From Insurgent to Incumbent
Democracy and State Development
Democratic Reforms in Dictatorships
Authoritarian Power Sharing
Revolution as Mass-Based Regime Change
Gender and Leadership in Executive Branch Politics
How the Party Commands the Gun
Introducing the One-Party Membership Dataset
Ideology and Revolution in Civil Wars
Revolutionary Violence and Counterrevolution
Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma
Political Order in Changing Societies
Sowing the Mustard Seed
Portuguese-speaking Africa
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Alliance Formation in Civil Wars
Seizing Power
Dictators and their Secret Police
Inside Rebellion
How Is Power Shared in Africa?
States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control
How Dictatorships Work
How Insurgency Begins
Securing the Peace
Governing for Revolution
The Wartime Origins of Democratization
When Soldiers Rebel
Constraining Dictatorship
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
The Ethiopian post-transition security sector reform experience
Measuring Revolution
Insurgent Armies
Personal Rule in Black Africa
Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government
Redistributive Political Transitions
The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes
The Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset
Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict
Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
What Happens When Coups Fail? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within
The Dictator's Power‐Sharing Dilemma
Crises and Crisis Generations
The Enemy Within
Patronage and Political Stability in Africa
Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict
African military coups d'état, 1956-2001
Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements
Democratic Subversion
Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma
The Origins of the EPRDF and the Prospects for the Prosperity Party
| Unique citing works | 44 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 11 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 44 |