Signaling Strength Through Power Sharing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071767 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jacque Gao (0000-0002-1118-7574, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen), Marton Szabo (0000-0002-3233-7797, Budapest University of Technology and Economics) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue | 2-3 |
| Pages | 310-329 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-27 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027251355757 |
| OpenAlex | W4411738456 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 34 |
This article develops a new theory of how a strong target regime can (partially) deter a sender from imposing sanctions over major issues. We develop a formal theoretic framework to show that, following a sender’s sanction threat, a strong target regime can signal its strength by deliberately weakening itself through always sharing power with a domestic opposition, while a weak target regime mixes between sharing and not sharing power with the opposition. The strategy offers the sender a better assessment of a target’s strength, enabling it to adjust its sanction policy accordingly and avoid the costs of a potentially ineffective sanction over a strong target regime. As a result, a strong target regime will be sanctioned with a lower probability than a weak one
Business · Physics · Political science · Power (physics · Power sharing · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
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The Sanctions Paradox
Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival
Strategic Information Transmission
Constraining Dictatorship
Threat by Example
U.S. Economic Sanction Threats Against China
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy
Conceal or Reveal? Managing Clandestine Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition
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Signaling Strength with Handicaps
Are Sanctions Effective
Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts
Winning the Game of Thrones
A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation
Alliance Formation and War
Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure
To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances
The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion
Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve
The Peruvian congressional elections of 1992
Not all dictators are equal
Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |