Trade Composition and Acquiescence to Sanction Threats
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6340978 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Akoto (0000-0002-1652-2394, University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA), Timothy M Peterson (0000-0003-1159-4898, University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA, corresponding author), Cameron G Thies (0000-0002-9932-1394, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 526-539 |
| Publication date | 2020-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Research Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912919837608 |
| OpenAlex | W2939758407 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 47 |
In this article, we argue that the composition of trade is an important determinant of vulnerability to sanctions. Trade composition has changed considerably over the years since World War II, with growth in intra-industry trade: the exchange of similar, often branded, commodities that follows from varied consumer preferences and economies of scale. Conversely, we see relatively less of the traditional inter-industry trade: exchange of distinct and often homogeneous commodities that follows from comparative advantage. We demonstrate that targets maintaining higher proportions of intra-industry trade with senders benefit from greater resilience against economic coercion and thus are less likely to acquiesce to sanction threats. Importantly, however, we contend that bilateral intra-industry trade does not necessarily prevent the onset of sanction threats. Statistical tests of sanction threat cases and directed dyad-years spanning 1962–2005 support our expectations
Acquiescence · Business · Coercion (linguistics · Composition (language · Economics · International economics · International trade · Political science · Sanctions · Trade barrier · Vulnerability (computing · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Health and Conflict Studies · Law · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Biding time versus timely retreat
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Democracy, Trade Networks, and International Condemnation of Russia Following the Invasion of Ukraine
International Trade, Cooperation, and Conflict
Economic Sanctions in Flux
Market adjustments to import sanctions
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International trade and cyber conflict
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Busted Sanctions
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Notes on Cepii’s Distances Measures
The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity
Interregional and International Trade
Unmasking the Black Knights
International Trade and US Relations with China
New trade, new politics
Taking the cue
Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005
Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy
Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy
Intraindustry Specialization and the Gains from Trade
A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage
Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict
Sanctions and Alternate Markets
Back to the Future
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
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The Domestic Politics of Trade and Conflict1
Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States1
Political Cleavages and Economic Sanctions
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered
Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade
Sleeping With Your Friends’ Enemies
Fools Suffer Gladly
Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions
The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion
Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence
How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade
Class Versus Industry Cleavages
On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions
Strategic Misspecification in Regression Models
Beyond Ricardo
Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
Economic Interdependence
Designing foreign policy
Trade networks and the Kantian peace
Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,83 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |