Biding time versus timely retreat
Asymmetric dependence, issue salience, and conflict duration
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3916232 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yuleng Zeng (0000-0003-2553-6293, University of South Carolina, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 719-733 |
| Publication date | 2021-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343320918917 |
| OpenAlex | W3036755360 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 50 |
Trade-conflict studies focus on whether and how economic interdependence suppresses interstate conflict initiation. Meanwhile, formal theories of war show that conflict initiation is inherently tied to its termination. In this article, I seek to bridge the two literature by utilizing a war of attrition model to formalize the relationship between economic dependence and conflict duration. I theorize that the strategic calculation ultimately comes down to a trade-off between biding one's time and retreating in a timely manner. In the context of economic attrition, states weigh the relative costs of suffering an additional round of economic disruption against the potential benefits of winning the disputed good. As such, economic dependence can have both coercive and informational effects and these effects are contingent upon issue salience. When the issue salience is low, the coercive effect dominates; states are more likely to quit conflicts as they suffer proportionally larger economic costs. When the issue salience is high enough, the informational effect can kick in; states are less likely to quit conflicts with increasing economic costs. I test these implications on the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) and the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data, finding strong support for the informational effect and suggestive evidence for the coercive one
Attrition · Cognitive psychology · Context (archaeology) · Economic interdependence · Economics · International conflict · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Salience (neuroscience) · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Medicine · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Economic Interdependence
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The complex structure of commercial peace contrasting trade interdependence, asymmetry, and multipolarity
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The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |