Yuleng Zeng
Biographic Data
| ID | 3821171 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yuleng Zeng |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yuleng |
| FAMILY NAME | Zeng |
| SIGNATURE | ZENG Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Groningen |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2553-6293 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Tools of the weak? Economic sanctions, threat perception, and conflict escalation
In international crises, do economic sanctions increase or reduce the risk of conflict escalation? Some studies suggest that sanctions can serve as a costly yet non-violent tool to demonstrate resolve. Others argue that because states tend to avoid self-imposed costs, the logic of costly signaling often unravels in practice: sanctions instead reveal weakness and may heighten the risk of escalation. To reconcile this debate, I shift away from the …
The Demand for Insurance: Incorporating the Severity of Losing Office into the Insurance Model of Judicial Independence
Popular insurance models of judicial independence contend that electoral competition induces executives to establish or maintain independence as insurance against the risks associated with losing office. Existing accounts, however, focus only on variation in the likelihood of losing office, treating risks associated with losing as constant. This inattention to the model’s causal logic limits theoretical development and empirical conclusions. We m…
Shock and awe: Economic sanctions and relative military spending
Economic sanctions could cause substantial harm to target states, forcing them to undertake tough guns-versus-butter trade-offs. Although existing research has argued that sanctioned countries reduce their military spending in absolute terms, it is unclear whether they do trade more guns for butter in relative terms. We argue that in the short run, sanctioned states have an incentive to channel proportionally more resources to the military for tw…
Alliances, state preferences, and trade networks: The impact of United States sanctions on dual-use trade
Export controls on dual-use commodities are crucial to US foreign policy goals. Research finds that US sanctions motivate third-party compliance with export controls. However, the sanctions-busting literature suggests that allies are more likely than non-allies to sabotage US sanctioning efforts. We argue that US allies export more controlled dual-use goods (CDU) when the importer is not facing US sanctions. However, US allies will not export mor…
Microchips and sneakers: Bilateral trade, shifting power, and interstate conflict
Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce …
Riding the Trojan Horse? EU Accession and Chinese Investment in CEE Countries
Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been expanding in recent years. As the economic ties deepen, security concerns also rise with arguments decrying Chinese investment and loans as a Trojan horse aiming at buying off political influence and dividing the European Union (EU) from within. On the other hand, some recent studies suggest that the volume and threat of Chinese capital have been exaggerated by politicians from diffe…
Does Money Buy Friends? Evidence From China's Belt and Road Initiative
Studies of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have focused on the strategic intentions of Beijing, with much less attention paid to its political effects. The argument that the initiative can improve political relationships with BRI countries is assumed rather than empirically grounded. This paper bridges the gap by studying countries’ cooperation and conflict with China. I find that (a) the initiative appears to marginally improve BRI countr…
Conflict and cooperation with trade partners
Escalating political conflict between major trade partners such as the US and China appears puzzling given theories linking trade to pacific international relations. We reconsider theories on bilateral trade, exposure to the global economy, and politics in order to explain contemporary events. Our approach departs from previous work in three key ways: we examine a broader range of conflictual and cooperative interactions together; we assume leade…
Biding time versus timely retreat: Asymmetric dependence, issue salience, and conflict duration
Trade-conflict studies focus on whether and how economic interdependence suppresses interstate conflict initiation. Meanwhile, formal theories of war show that conflict initiation is inherently tied to its termination. In this article, I seek to bridge the two literature by utilizing a war of attrition model to formalize the relationship between economic dependence and conflict duration. I theorize that the strategic calculation ultimately comes …
Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty
Trade–conflict studies have shown that economic dependence can promote peace by costly signaling resolve. However, with higher economic integration, targets also become more vulnerable to coercion and potential challengers are incentivized to bluff. In return, target states may resist more, raising the question of whether trade still promotes peace. I theorize that bluffing does not stoke conflict in this context because the bargaining environmen…
Conflict and cooperation with trade partners
Escalating political conflict between major trade partners such as the US and China appears puzzling given theories linking trade to pacific international relations. We reconsider theories on bilateral trade, exposure to the global economy, and politics in order to explain contemporary events. Our approach departs from previous work in three key ways: we examine a broader range of conflictual and cooperative interactions together; we assume leade…
Does Money Buy Friends? Evidence From China's Belt and Road Initiative
Studies of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have focused on the strategic intentions of Beijing, with much less attention paid to its political effects. The argument that the initiative can improve political relationships with BRI countries is assumed rather than empirically grounded. This paper bridges the gap by studying countries’ cooperation and conflict with China. I find that (a) the initiative appears to marginally improve BRI countr…
Alliances, state preferences, and trade networks: The impact of United States sanctions on dual-use trade
Export controls on dual-use commodities are crucial to US foreign policy goals. Research finds that US sanctions motivate third-party compliance with export controls. However, the sanctions-busting literature suggests that allies are more likely than non-allies to sabotage US sanctioning efforts. We argue that US allies export more controlled dual-use goods (CDU) when the importer is not facing US sanctions. However, US allies will not export mor…
Riding the Trojan Horse? EU Accession and Chinese Investment in CEE Countries
Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been expanding in recent years. As the economic ties deepen, security concerns also rise with arguments decrying Chinese investment and loans as a Trojan horse aiming at buying off political influence and dividing the European Union (EU) from within. On the other hand, some recent studies suggest that the volume and threat of Chinese capital have been exaggerated by politicians from diffe…
Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty
Trade–conflict studies have shown that economic dependence can promote peace by costly signaling resolve. However, with higher economic integration, targets also become more vulnerable to coercion and potential challengers are incentivized to bluff. In return, target states may resist more, raising the question of whether trade still promotes peace. I theorize that bluffing does not stoke conflict in this context because the bargaining environmen…
Microchips and sneakers: Bilateral trade, shifting power, and interstate conflict
Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce …
Biding time versus timely retreat: Asymmetric dependence, issue salience, and conflict duration
Trade-conflict studies focus on whether and how economic interdependence suppresses interstate conflict initiation. Meanwhile, formal theories of war show that conflict initiation is inherently tied to its termination. In this article, I seek to bridge the two literature by utilizing a war of attrition model to formalize the relationship between economic dependence and conflict duration. I theorize that the strategic calculation ultimately comes …
Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty
Trade–conflict studies have shown that economic dependence can promote peace by costly signaling resolve. However, with higher economic integration, targets also become more vulnerable to coercion and potential challengers are incentivized to bluff. In return, target states may resist more, raising the question of whether trade still promotes peace. I theorize that bluffing does not stoke conflict in this context because the bargaining environmen…
Does Money Buy Friends? Evidence From China's Belt and Road Initiative
Studies of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have focused on the strategic intentions of Beijing, with much less attention paid to its political effects. The argument that the initiative can improve political relationships with BRI countries is assumed rather than empirically grounded. This paper bridges the gap by studying countries’ cooperation and conflict with China. I find that (a) the initiative appears to marginally improve BRI countr…
Conflict and cooperation with trade partners
Escalating political conflict between major trade partners such as the US and China appears puzzling given theories linking trade to pacific international relations. We reconsider theories on bilateral trade, exposure to the global economy, and politics in order to explain contemporary events. Our approach departs from previous work in three key ways: we examine a broader range of conflictual and cooperative interactions together; we assume leade…
Biding time versus timely retreat: Asymmetric dependence, issue salience, and conflict duration
Trade-conflict studies focus on whether and how economic interdependence suppresses interstate conflict initiation. Meanwhile, formal theories of war show that conflict initiation is inherently tied to its termination. In this article, I seek to bridge the two literature by utilizing a war of attrition model to formalize the relationship between economic dependence and conflict duration. I theorize that the strategic calculation ultimately comes …
Riding the Trojan Horse? EU Accession and Chinese Investment in CEE Countries
Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been expanding in recent years. As the economic ties deepen, security concerns also rise with arguments decrying Chinese investment and loans as a Trojan horse aiming at buying off political influence and dividing the European Union (EU) from within. On the other hand, some recent studies suggest that the volume and threat of Chinese capital have been exaggerated by politicians from diffe…
Alliances, state preferences, and trade networks: The impact of United States sanctions on dual-use trade
Export controls on dual-use commodities are crucial to US foreign policy goals. Research finds that US sanctions motivate third-party compliance with export controls. However, the sanctions-busting literature suggests that allies are more likely than non-allies to sabotage US sanctioning efforts. We argue that US allies export more controlled dual-use goods (CDU) when the importer is not facing US sanctions. However, US allies will not export mor…
Microchips and sneakers: Bilateral trade, shifting power, and interstate conflict
Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce …
The Demand for Insurance: Incorporating the Severity of Losing Office into the Insurance Model of Judicial Independence
Popular insurance models of judicial independence contend that electoral competition induces executives to establish or maintain independence as insurance against the risks associated with losing office. Existing accounts, however, focus only on variation in the likelihood of losing office, treating risks associated with losing as constant. This inattention to the model’s causal logic limits theoretical development and empirical conclusions. We m…
Shock and awe: Economic sanctions and relative military spending
Economic sanctions could cause substantial harm to target states, forcing them to undertake tough guns-versus-butter trade-offs. Although existing research has argued that sanctioned countries reduce their military spending in absolute terms, it is unclear whether they do trade more guns for butter in relative terms. We argue that in the short run, sanctioned states have an incentive to channel proportionally more resources to the military for tw…
Tools of the weak? Economic sanctions, threat perception, and conflict escalation
In international crises, do economic sanctions increase or reduce the risk of conflict escalation? Some studies suggest that sanctions can serve as a costly yet non-violent tool to demonstrate resolve. Others argue that because states tend to avoid self-imposed costs, the logic of costly signaling often unravels in practice: sanctions instead reveal weakness and may heighten the risk of escalation. To reconcile this debate, I shift away from the …
Political science (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Economic Sanctions and International Relations (4 works) · International trade (4 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works)