Winning the Game of Thrones

Leadership Succession in Modern Autocracies

Bibliographic Data

ID6284558
AuthorsAlicia Meng (0000-0002-0686-3734, University of Virginia, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume65
Issue5
Pages950-981
Publication date2021-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002720978807
OpenAlexW3111270833
LanguageEN
Citations received18
References cited44

Under what conditions can dictatorships manage peaceful leadership transitions? This article argues that constitutional succession rules are critical for modern dictatorships, contrary to the predominant scholarly focus on hereditary succession or parties. An effective succession rule needs to solve dual problems of peaceful exit and peaceful entry. First, the rule must enable incumbents to exit power peacefully by reducing coup threats. Second, the rule must empower the designated successor to ensure that they can enter power peacefully. Constitutional rules help solve both problems, and are particularly effective when they appoint the vice president as the designated successor. The vice president’s access to material resources deters other factions from challenging the succession procedure, whereas designating successors without a power base is ineffective. Using original data on constitutional rules in African autocracies, I show that regimes that formally designate the vice president as the successor are more likely to undergo peaceful transitions

Autocracy · Core (optical fiber · Democracy · Dictatorship · Ecological succession · Economic system · Economics · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Rule of law · Sociology · Successor cardinal · Veto · Engineering · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · Law · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts · Political Conflict and Governance

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