Autocracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6561967 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gordon Tullock (George Mason University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Publication date | 2012-11-22 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Autocracy (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Springer (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-94-015-7741-0 |
| OpenAlex | W4234545132 |
| Open Library | OL37213185M |
| ISBN | 9789401577410 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 170 |
Autocracy · China · Communism · Democracy · Economic history · Political science · Politics · Computer Science · History · Law · Political Science Research and Education
Why Kill Deposed Leaders? Regime Types and Post-tenure Fates
Revolutionary Legacy, Power Structure, and Grassroots Capitalism under the Red Flag in China
Dictators and Their Viziers
The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains
The Autonomy of the Political within Political Economy
Retirement planning for dictators
The Origins of the State from Reciprocity to Coercive Power
On the Durability of King and Council
Environmental Interest Groups and Authoritarian Regime Diversity
Aging gracefully? Why old autocrats hold competitive elections
The Politics of Co-optation
Contentious Elites in China
Ruling the Ruling Coalition
Federalism at war
Commitment to local autonomy in non-democracies
The origins and evolution of democracy
Constitutional monarchy as power sharing
Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government
Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies
The political economy of expulsion
Gordon Tullock
The problem of political calculation in autocracies
Democracy, dictatorship, and transformation
On the overthrow or endurance of kings
Autocratic family policy
Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship
Political credibility and economic growth in less developed countries
Distributional Bargaining and the Speed of Structural Change in the Petroleum Exporting Labor Surplus Economies
What happens to growth when a long‐term political leader leaves office
How Ethnic Exclusion Influences Rebellion and Leader Survival
Konsens und Gewalt. Zur handlungstheoretischen Modellierung sozialer Mechanismen der Normentstehung
Generals, Dictators, and Kings
Failed coups, political survival, and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes
Costly signaling in autocracy
The Politics of Preferential Trade Liberalization in Authoritarian Countries
Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies
Top-Down Accountability, Social Unrest, and Anticorruption in China
What is new and what is institutional in the new institutional economics
Digital Repression Beyond the Masses
Development of Autocratic Systems
Constraining Dictatorship
Personalization and Elite Rhetoric
Communicating authoritarian elite cohesion
When Children Join the Coalition
Good Czar, bad boyars
Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave
Institutionalization of the Revolution
The inefficiency of moderate political coercion
Leadership Turnover, Domestic Constraints, and International Conflict
Does regime type matter for economic institutions in non‐democracies
Constitutions and Commitment
Storm from the Steppes
Rural economies and leadership change in Central Asia
I Will Follow
Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy
Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government
The predatory state and coercive assimilation
The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession
A changing of the guard
Finding social dilemma
Oil and the duration of dictatorships
Marketing Communist Party membership in China
Revolutions of the mind, (threats of) actual revolutions, and institutional change
Modeling constitutional choice
Military conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimes
Democracy and fiscal-policy response to Covid-19
Political successions and the growth of government
Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments
Movement split
The Investment Theory of Wars
From economic imperialism to social science inspiration
The life and times of Gordon Tullock
The shape of public choice to come
Political systems and distortions
Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies
Autocracy and coups d’etat
Thanks to Gordon Tullock
Nietzschean Development Failures
Tullock challenges
How to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise
Rational Bandits
Democracy as insurance
Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures
Revolutionary leaders and the punishment of critics
On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes
The political economy of imperial power successions in ancient China
The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock
Assessing the effect of international terrorism on civil liberties using a potential outcomes framework
Gordon Tullock
Economic effects of a conflict-prone world order
Strategic gerontocracy
Expropriation of foreign direct investments
Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth
Gordon Tullock
The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock
Sparks and prairie fires
Perestroika and public choice
Why do military dictatorships become presidential democracies? Mapping the democratic interests of autocratic regimes
Political institutions and debt crises
Polity Size and the Institutionalization of Leadership Succession
| Unique citing works | 170 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,59 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 2026 (38) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 169 |