Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11064992 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Georgy Egorov (0009-0006-8835-9094, Northwestern University), Konstantin Sonin (0000-0003-1581-9951, University of Chicago, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-02-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.70039 |
| OpenAlex | W7129611356 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 66 |
Many dictatorships end up with a series of disastrous decisions such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. Even if a certain policy choice is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao's Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot's collectivization drive, they typically involve both a miscalculation by the leadership and an institutional environment in which better informed subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being implemented. We offer a dynamic model of nondemocratic politics in which repression and bad decision making are self‐reinforcing. Repression reduces the immediate threat to the regime, yet raises future stakes for the dictator; with higher stakes, the dictator puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence, which in turn increases the probability of a wrong policy choice. Our theory offers an explanation of how rational dictators end up in an informational bubble even in highly institutionalized regimes
Aggression · Autocracy · Dictator · Dictatorship · Foreign policy · Loyalty · Politics · Soviet union · Political Conflict and Governance · Russia and Soviet political economy · Soviet and Russian History
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Reputation and imperfect information
Investment without democracy
The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
A Theory of Political Transitions
Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance
Dictators and Their Viziers
The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959–1961
The Voracity Effect
Sultanistic Regimes
The Economics of World War II
Caught off guard? Evaluating how external experts in Germany warned about Russia’s war on Ukraine
Information, Democracy, and Autocracy
Guerrillas and Generals
The Logic of Political Survival
Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships
A Theory of Power Wars
Utility-based predictions of military escalation
Mao’s last revolution”
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Autocracy
The Agency Problem Underlying Repression
Dual-Layered Coordination and Political Instability
Credibility in Compliance and Punishment
The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships and Outside Options for Subordinates
Formal Models of Authoritarian Regimes
Ambition, personalist regimes, and control of authoritarian leaders
The War in Ukraine
Social Mobility, Middle Class, and Political Transitions
Rationalist explanations for war
Authoritarian Power Sharing
Domestic Explanations of International Relations
The Dictator's Power‐Sharing Dilemma
The Strategic Shuffle
Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes
China's Strategic Censorship
How the Party Commands the Gun
Political Control
The Guardianship Dilemma
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media
Strongmen and Straw Men
Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War
Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability
Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma
Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |