Konstantin Sonin
Biographic Data
| ID | 968913 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Konstantin Sonin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Konstantin |
| FAMILY NAME | Sonin |
| SIGNATURE | SONIN K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Chicago |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1581-9951 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 281 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 23 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Electoral college and election fraud
One frequently overlooked aspect of the US-style electoral college system is that it discourages election fraud. In a presidential election based on popular vote, competing parties are motivated to manipulate votes in areas where they have the most significant influence, such as states where they control local executive offices, legislatures and the judiciary. With the electoral college, the incentives for fraud shift to swing states where the lo…
Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy
Many dictatorships end up with a series of disastrous decisions such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. Even if a certain policy choice is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao's Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot's collectivization drive, they typically involve both a miscalculation by the leadership and an institutional environment in which better informed subordinates have no chance to…
Political Economy of Information Provision
When Do Citizens Support Peace-Building? Economic Hardship and Civilian Support for Rebel Reintegration
Key to the success of international peace-building efforts is the cooperation and support of civilian populations. Studies show that economic considerations shape combatants’ willingness to lay down their arms. We study a related but under-studied question: does economic hardship impact civilian support for conflict cessation? If reintegration of former combatants into productive economic sectors threatens civilians’ own incomes, then support for…
Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies
We analyse a model of political competition in which the elite form endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased candidate if the elite’s endorsement provides sufficient information about her competence. The elite size and the degree of information aggregation by the…
How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes
This corrigendum corrects a minor mistake in the analysis of “How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes” by Monika Nalepa and Konstantin Sonin. The definition of Eum(x*O|N) on page 378 of the article mistakenly did not include the following term: −μCKC. This omission does not affect the main results presented in the paper. It, however, changes the calculations of formulas on pages 379 in Figure 3 and equation 2, 378, 380…
Rebel Capacity, Intelligence Gathering, and Combat Tactics
Classic and modern theories of rebel warfare emphasize the role of resource endowments. We demonstrate that intelligence gathering, made possible by these endowments, plays a critical role in determining specifics of how rebels launch complex attacks against better equipped government forces. We test implications of a theoretical model using highly detailed data about Afghan rebel attacks, insurgent‐led spy networks, and counterinsurgent operatio…
How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes
Why are transparency regimes, such as lustration, relatively rare? When some politicians have something to conceal, why would their opponents not press for transparency? To analyze transitional justice, we build a model that explains why uncompromised politicians might avoid a transparency regime, which could signal to voters that they are clean. We model the interaction between an incumbent, an opposition leader, a strategic blackmailer, and vot…
Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation
Information operations are considered a central element of modern warfare and counter-insurgency, yet there remains little systematic evidence of their effectiveness. Using a geographic quasi-experiment conducted during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, we demonstrate that civilians exposed to the government’s information campaign resulted in more civilian security cooperation, which in turn increased bomb neutralisations. These results …
Elections in Non-Democracies
Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system, but elections are common in other regimes as well. Such an election might be a pure farce, with the incumbents getting close to 100% of the vote. In other instances, incumbents allow opposition candidates to be on the ballot and run campaigns, limit electoral fraud, e.g., by inviting international observers, all to make elections appear fair. In our model, the incumbent is inform…
Poverty and economic dislocation reduce compliance with Covid-19 shelter-in-place protocols
Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics
The last decade has witnessed growing interest among political scientists and economists in nondemocratic politics. This trend has been reflected in increasingly rigorous game-theoretic modeling of its various aspects: regime persistence and breakdown, ruling-coalition formation and leadership change, protests and repression, formal institutions and elections, and censorship and media control. We review this research agenda, focusing on the found…
Political Economy in a Changing World
We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural “single-crossing” (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide con…
Government control of the media
A Political Theory of Populism
When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses “populist” policies—that is, policies to the left of the median voter—as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center po…
Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections
Electoral fraud is a widespread phenomenon, especially outside the developed world. Despite abundant qualitative and anecdotal evidence on its existence from around the world, there is very limited quantitative evidence on the extent of electoral fraud. We exploit random assignment of independent observers to 156 of 3,164 polling stations in the city of Moscow to estimate the effect of electoral fraud on the outcome of the Russian parliamentary e…
Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off
The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those who are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a perso…
Businessman Candidates
Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that “businessman candidacy” and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for of…
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
Every dictator dislikes free media. Yet, many nondemocratic countries have partially free or almost free media. In this article, we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory. In our model, free media allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of government. The importance of this benefit varies with the natural resource e…
Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a bankruptcy law transplant
Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant
Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights
Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
Every dictator dislikes free media. Yet, many nondemocratic countries have partially free or almost free media. In this article, we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory. In our model, free media allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of government. The importance of this benefit varies with the natural resource e…
Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics
The last decade has witnessed growing interest among political scientists and economists in nondemocratic politics. This trend has been reflected in increasingly rigorous game-theoretic modeling of its various aspects: regime persistence and breakdown, ruling-coalition formation and leadership change, protests and repression, formal institutions and elections, and censorship and media control. We review this research agenda, focusing on the found…
Businessman Candidates
Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that “businessman candidacy” and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for of…
Elections in Non-Democracies
Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system, but elections are common in other regimes as well. Such an election might be a pure farce, with the incumbents getting close to 100% of the vote. In other instances, incumbents allow opposition candidates to be on the ballot and run campaigns, limit electoral fraud, e.g., by inviting international observers, all to make elections appear fair. In our model, the incumbent is inform…
Political Economy in a Changing World
We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural “single-crossing” (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide con…
Rebel Capacity, Intelligence Gathering, and Combat Tactics
Classic and modern theories of rebel warfare emphasize the role of resource endowments. We demonstrate that intelligence gathering, made possible by these endowments, plays a critical role in determining specifics of how rebels launch complex attacks against better equipped government forces. We test implications of a theoretical model using highly detailed data about Afghan rebel attacks, insurgent‐led spy networks, and counterinsurgent operatio…
Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation
Information operations are considered a central element of modern warfare and counter-insurgency, yet there remains little systematic evidence of their effectiveness. Using a geographic quasi-experiment conducted during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, we demonstrate that civilians exposed to the government’s information campaign resulted in more civilian security cooperation, which in turn increased bomb neutralisations. These results …
Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights
Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence
Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant
Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a bankruptcy law transplant
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
Every dictator dislikes free media. Yet, many nondemocratic countries have partially free or almost free media. In this article, we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory. In our model, free media allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of government. The importance of this benefit varies with the natural resource e…
Businessman Candidates
Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that “businessman candidacy” and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for of…
Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off
The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those who are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a perso…
A Political Theory of Populism
When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses “populist” policies—that is, policies to the left of the median voter—as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center po…
Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections
Electoral fraud is a widespread phenomenon, especially outside the developed world. Despite abundant qualitative and anecdotal evidence on its existence from around the world, there is very limited quantitative evidence on the extent of electoral fraud. We exploit random assignment of independent observers to 156 of 3,164 polling stations in the city of Moscow to estimate the effect of electoral fraud on the outcome of the Russian parliamentary e…
Government control of the media
Political Economy in a Changing World
We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural “single-crossing” (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide con…
Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics
The last decade has witnessed growing interest among political scientists and economists in nondemocratic politics. This trend has been reflected in increasingly rigorous game-theoretic modeling of its various aspects: regime persistence and breakdown, ruling-coalition formation and leadership change, protests and repression, formal institutions and elections, and censorship and media control. We review this research agenda, focusing on the found…
Poverty and economic dislocation reduce compliance with Covid-19 shelter-in-place protocols
Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation
Information operations are considered a central element of modern warfare and counter-insurgency, yet there remains little systematic evidence of their effectiveness. Using a geographic quasi-experiment conducted during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, we demonstrate that civilians exposed to the government’s information campaign resulted in more civilian security cooperation, which in turn increased bomb neutralisations. These results …
Elections in Non-Democracies
Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system, but elections are common in other regimes as well. Such an election might be a pure farce, with the incumbents getting close to 100% of the vote. In other instances, incumbents allow opposition candidates to be on the ballot and run campaigns, limit electoral fraud, e.g., by inviting international observers, all to make elections appear fair. In our model, the incumbent is inform…
How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes
Why are transparency regimes, such as lustration, relatively rare? When some politicians have something to conceal, why would their opponents not press for transparency? To analyze transitional justice, we build a model that explains why uncompromised politicians might avoid a transparency regime, which could signal to voters that they are clean. We model the interaction between an incumbent, an opposition leader, a strategic blackmailer, and vot…
How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes
This corrigendum corrects a minor mistake in the analysis of “How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes” by Monika Nalepa and Konstantin Sonin. The definition of Eum(x*O|N) on page 378 of the article mistakenly did not include the following term: −μCKC. This omission does not affect the main results presented in the paper. It, however, changes the calculations of formulas on pages 379 in Figure 3 and equation 2, 378, 380…
Rebel Capacity, Intelligence Gathering, and Combat Tactics
Classic and modern theories of rebel warfare emphasize the role of resource endowments. We demonstrate that intelligence gathering, made possible by these endowments, plays a critical role in determining specifics of how rebels launch complex attacks against better equipped government forces. We test implications of a theoretical model using highly detailed data about Afghan rebel attacks, insurgent‐led spy networks, and counterinsurgent operatio…
When Do Citizens Support Peace-Building? Economic Hardship and Civilian Support for Rebel Reintegration
Key to the success of international peace-building efforts is the cooperation and support of civilian populations. Studies show that economic considerations shape combatants’ willingness to lay down their arms. We study a related but under-studied question: does economic hardship impact civilian support for conflict cessation? If reintegration of former combatants into productive economic sectors threatens civilians’ own incomes, then support for…
Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies
We analyse a model of political competition in which the elite form endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased candidate if the elite’s endorsement provides sufficient information about her competence. The elite size and the degree of information aggregation by the…
Electoral college and election fraud
One frequently overlooked aspect of the US-style electoral college system is that it discourages election fraud. In a presidential election based on popular vote, competing parties are motivated to manipulate votes in areas where they have the most significant influence, such as states where they control local executive offices, legislatures and the judiciary. With the electoral college, the incentives for fraud shift to swing states where the lo…
Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy
Many dictatorships end up with a series of disastrous decisions such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. Even if a certain policy choice is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao's Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot's collectivization drive, they typically involve both a miscalculation by the leadership and an institutional environment in which better informed subordinates have no chance to…
Political Economy of Information Provision
Economics (17 works) · Political science (15 works) · Law (14 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (12 works) · Politics (10 works) · Business (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (6 works)