Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9720106 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marina Agranov (0000-0002-0642-7975, California Institute of Technology & NBER), Ran Eilat (0000-0001-8650-6026, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), Konstantin Sonin (0000-0003-1581-9951, University of Chicago) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 135 |
| Issue | 672 |
| Pages | 2402-2425 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueaf029 |
| OpenAlex | W4410888405 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 48 |
We analyse a model of political competition in which the elite form endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased candidate if the elite’s endorsement provides sufficient information about her competence. The elite size and the degree of information aggregation by the elite depend on the extent to which the median voter follows the elite’s advice. A higher cost of redistribution minimises the elite’s information advantage, hinders information transmission and decreases the expected competence of the elected politician
Business · Statistics · Stratified sampling · Corruption and Economic Development · Mathematics
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |