Bayesian Persuasion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23375511 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Emir Kamenica (0000-0002-4225-2914, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Office 518, Chicago, IL 60637.), Matthew Gentzkow (0000-0001-7758-8656, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Office 514, Chicago, IL 60637.) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 2590-2615 |
| Publication date | 2011-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Economic Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0002-8282 • E-ISSN: 1944-7981 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/aer.101.6.2590 |
| OpenAlex | W4255572092 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 141 |
| References cited | 22 |
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respect to the alignment of the sender's and the receiver's preferences. Finally, we apply our results to persuasion by litigators, lobbyists, and salespeople. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K40, M31)
Action (physics) · Bayesian probability · Communication source · Comparative statics · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Persuasion · SIGNAL (programming language) · Telecommunications · Welfare · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology · Social Psychology
Persuasion with Multiple Actions
Panics and Early Warnings
Subversive Conversations
Persuasion and Matching
Selective exposure reduces voluntary contributions
Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
Information Cascades and Social Learning
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour
The small effects of political advertising are small regardless of context, message, sender, or receiver
Government control of the media
On Transparency in Organizations
Making Policies Matter
Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation
A Characterisation of ‘Phelpsian’ Statistical Discrimination
Beliefs, credence goods and information campaigns
A Model of Scientific Communication
Noisy Persuasion
Online Advertising and Privacy
Simple Auctions
Engineering Social Learning
(Pro-)Social Learning and Strategic Disclosure
Mediated talk
Cheap talk with coarse understanding
Persuasion in Networks
The value of mediated communication
The analogical foundations of cooperation
Informationally Simple Implementation
Sequential Persuasion
When does coordination require centralization? The roles of organizational inertia and diversity
Selective memory of a psychological agent
Persuasion
On the hardness of designing public signals
A Theory of Misinformation Spread on Social Networks
Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion
Information structures in college admissions
Attention and Regret
Optimal information disclosure in competing contests with budget constrained players
Competitive disclosure of information to a rationally inattentive agent
Information Cascades and Social Learning
When does a firm disclose product information
Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors
Voter Learning, Unidimensional Ideology, and Polarization
Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
(Pro-) Social Learning and Strategic Disclosure
Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
Propaganda and Gender in Cold War Satire
Zetar
From apprentice to president? Entertainment TV and US elections
Discussion of “Risk Preference Types, Limited Consideration, and Welfare” by Levon Barseghyan and Francesca Molinari
The rejection game
Bayesian persuasion followed by receiver’s mechanism design
Legal errors and evidence rules with biased law enforcers
Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication
Compromising Accuracy to Encourage Regulatory Participation
Endogenous ambiguity under commodification of probabilistic information
Persuasion with simplistic worldviews
Reasonable doubt
Belief inducibility and informativeness
Persuasion under ambiguity
Oriented data-generating processes
Ideological screening with content provision
Does Valuing Free Speech Affect Norms of Tolerance? Evidence From Individual Preferences
Understanding influence in informational lobbying
Political Interventions in the Administration of Justice
Polarized Extremes and the Confused Centre
Strategies of Election Rigging
Transparency and Stability
Ruling the Ruling Coalition
Do Free Food and Beverages Bring People to the Political Meeting? The Survey Experiment of Attendance-Buying
European Union, transnational terrorism and the strategic choice of counterterrorism policies in democratic countries
Unshrouding product-specific attributes through financial education
Diffusion in social networks
Propaganda to persuade
The strategic benefits of overconfidence
Promotional Reviews
The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics
Legitimacy and the Fluid Singaporean Welfare State
Voting over Disclosure Standards
In Aid We Trust
Price Discrimination in Selection Markets
Deleting a Signal
Révélation de l’information par un principal au budget limité
Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
Rational Polarization
Political Economy of Information Provision
Screening with Persuasion
Attraction versus Persuasion
Indirect Persuasion
Persuasion
How group deliberation shapes distributional preferences
Rational attitude change by reference cues when information elaboration requires effort
Information design and sensitivity to market fundamentals
Shannon meets Myerson
Delegation to incentivize information production
Signaling through Bayesian persuasion
Experiments versus distributions of posteriors
Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets
The institutional foundations of the power to persuade
Designing Deliberation for Decentralized Decisions
Collective decision-making of voters with heterogeneous levels of rationality
| Unique citing works | 141 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 9,4 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 137 |