Emir Kamenica
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867378 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Emir Kamenica |
| GIVEN NAMES | Emir |
| FAMILY NAME | Kamenica |
| SIGNATURE | KAMENICA E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Chicago |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4225-2914 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Information Economics
Labor Supply of Politicians: Labor Supply of Politicians
Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re-election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by colle…
Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households
We examine causes and consequences of relative income within households. We show that the distribution of the share of income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp drop to the right of 12 , where the wife’s income exceeds the husband’s income. We argue that this pattern is best explained by gender identity norms, which induce an aversion to a situation where the wife earns more than her husband. We present evidence that this aversion also impacts m…
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Voters, dictators, and peons: Expressive voting and pivotality
Bayesian Persuasion
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respe…
Perils of Giving Gifts Instead of Charging Prices
Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment
We study dating behavior using data from a Speed Dating experiment where we generate random matching of subjects and create random variation in the number of potential partners. Our design allows us to directly observe individual decisions rather than just final matches. Women put greater weight on the intelligence and the race of partner, while men respond more to physical attractiveness. Moreover, men do not value women's intelligence or ambiti…
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Voters, dictators, and peons: Expressive voting and pivotality
Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment
We study dating behavior using data from a Speed Dating experiment where we generate random matching of subjects and create random variation in the number of potential partners. Our design allows us to directly observe individual decisions rather than just final matches. Women put greater weight on the intelligence and the race of partner, while men respond more to physical attractiveness. Moreover, men do not value women's intelligence or ambiti…
Perils of Giving Gifts Instead of Charging Prices
Bayesian Persuasion
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respe…
Voters, dictators, and peons: Expressive voting and pivotality
Labor Supply of Politicians: Labor Supply of Politicians
Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re-election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by colle…
Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households
We examine causes and consequences of relative income within households. We show that the distribution of the share of income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp drop to the right of 12 , where the wife’s income exceeds the husband’s income. We argue that this pattern is best explained by gender identity norms, which induce an aversion to a situation where the wife earns more than her husband. We present evidence that this aversion also impacts m…
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Information Economics
Economics (6 works) · Political science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Law (3 works)